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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some profound interstitial change in the
very tissue of the law."-OrrvE WENDELL HoLmxs, COLLECTED LscAL PAPEas (1920)
269.

Comments
CumuLATIvE VoTiNG VimsUS CLASsnIcATioN or DIRECTORS n MIssounx

For some time it has been thought that a conflict exists between statutory
or constitutional provisions for mandatory cumulative voting for directors in

(38)

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

1

19571 '

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1957], Art. 9
COMMENTS

a corporation and statutes which permit classification of directors.% The provision
for cumulative voting in Missouri is contained in the constitution and reads as
follows:In all elections for directors or managers of any corporation, each
shareholder shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggregate
as shall equal the number of shares held by him, multiplied by the
number of directors or managers to be elected, and may cast the whole
number of votes, either in person or by proxy, for one candidate, or distribute such votes among two or more candidates; and such directors
or managers shall not be elected in any other manner; provided that this
section shall not apply to co-operative associations, societies, or exchanges
organized under the law.
It will be noticed the section provides for mandatory cumulative voting and all
other voting methods are prohibited.
By statute Missouri permits a classified board. The pertinent provision reads
as follows:2

The number of directors of a corporation shall be not less than three
nor more than twenty-one, to be elected by ballot by the shareholders in
such corporation. Any corporation may elect its directors for one or more
years, not to exceed three years, the time of service and mode of classification to be provided for by the bylaws of the corporation; provided,
however, that there shall be an annual election for such number or proportion of directors as may be found upon dividing the entire number
if directors by the number of years composing a term ...
The apparent conflict between the statutory provision allowing "staggered"
elections and the constitutional provision commanding cumulative voting for
directors becomes obvious when we consider the mechanics of the cumulative
voting system.' If no provision for cumulative voting is made, the right does
not exist, and a shareholder controlling fifty-one percent of the voting stock could
elect his entire slate of directors. 5 If cumulative voting is allowed, however, the
stockholder is entitled to votes equal to the number of his shares, multiplied by

1. For historical background see WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECrORS (1951), which also provides an excellent discussion of the whole subject

of cumulative voting. For the problem in general, see Ballantine, 1 U. OF CHI. L.
REV. 357 (1934); Bowes and De Bow, 22 MINN L. REV. 351 (1937); Curren, 32
MICH. L. REV. 743 (1934); Luce, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1291 (1952); 56 DIcK. L. REv.
330 (1952); 27 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 357 (1953).
2. Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 6. The corresponding statutory provision is Mo.
REV. STAT. § 351.245 (1949).
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.315 (1949).
4. A detailed discussion of the mechanics of the cumulative system is beyond
the scope of this note. For those seeking more detailed information, see Cole, Legal
and MathematicalAspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950) ; Gerstenberg, the Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, J. op ACCOUNTING (Jan. 1910); Williams, op. cit. supra note 1.
5. 13 AM. Jua. § 487; 5 FLEtCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2048 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1952).
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the number of directors to be elected, which the shareholder may cast for a single
director or distribute among the other candidates as he sees fit. In this manner
it is sought to give the minority shareholders representation in proportions roughly
equivalent to the percentage of their voting stock. It is evident that any decrease
in the number of directors to be elected would require an increase in the percentage of stock necessary to elect a director. Thus if nine directors are to be
elected, the percentage of votes necessary to elect one director would be ten percent,
plus one' share. If only three directors are to be elected, however, the percentage
necessary to elect one director has increased to twenty-five percent, plus one
share.6 Consequently a provision which allows less than all the directors of a
corporation to be elected at the same time increases the difficulty in securing minority representation through cumulative voting.
In view of the fact that twenty-one states have either a statutory or constitutional provision for mandatory cumulative voting, it is somewhat surprising
that the validity of the provisions for staggered terms found in a number of
these states have given rise to so little litigation. To date only two cases have
raised the issue.7
In Humphry v. Winous Companys the conflict was between different sections
of the same act. The section which gave shareholders the right to cumulate their
votes concluded:9 "Such right to vote cumulatively shall not be restricted or
qualified by any provisions in the articles or regulations." Another sectionlo of
the act provided that the articles or regulations of the corporation might provide
for classification of directors, whose terms were not to exceed three years. At
the annual meeting of shareholders, the code of regulations of the Winous Company were amended by vote of the shareholders to provide for classification of
the three directors so that each should have a three-year term and be elected in
successive years. The plaintiff controlled over forty percent of the voting stock.
The practical effect of the amendment was, of course, to nullify completely plaintiff's chances to elect one of the three directors by cumulating his votes.
On first appeal the court of appeals held that the prohibition against restricting or qualifying the right of cumulative voting by code regulations was specific
in character and therefore restricted or modified the applicability of the general
provision for classification. The court did not hold that the provision for classi-

6. For a state by state breakdown see Williams, op. cit., supra note 1, at

8-10.

'7. In Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania (1944), three judges said there was doubt as to the constitutionality of the staggered voting system, but did not pass on the question.
In Cohen v. A.M. Byers Co., 363 Pa. 618, 70 A.2d 837 (1950), the court avoided
passing on the issue.
8. 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 1955); rev'd 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d. 780
(1956). :
9. OHo Ruv. CODE § 1701.58 (1956).
1O. OHio Pay. CODE § 1701.64 (1956).
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fication was necessarily void, but rather the court suggested that it was modified
only to the extent that it qualified the right to vote cumulatively. The court
emphasized that in the instant case the cumulative right was completely destroyed
by the classification of the three-director board. In view of the specific prohibition
against restricting or qualifying the cumulative voting privilege by the articles,
however, it would appear that under the court of appeals' decision, any attempt
at classification would be invalid, because the effect would necessarily be to "qualify" the shareholders' right to cumulate their votes.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals.'%
The court's handling of the problem was centered around the answers to two
questions: Did the General Assembly intend to guarantee that the right to vote
cumulatively should not be restricted or qualified, or did it intend to guarantee
that the effectiveness of cumulative voting should not be restricted or qualified?
The court assumed that the General Assembly in enacting the two statutes intended to give effect to both; and the court determined that if the section providing
for staggered terms were to have any effect, the cumulative provision must be
construed as merely guaranteeing the iight to vote cumulatively rather than insuring minority representation on the board of directors. The court stated:1I
"But we are of the opinion that the throwing of an aura of uncertainty and confusion around the statutory provision for classification of directors is not required
by the construction of the statutory provision for cumulative voting." The court
undoubtedly had reference here to the possibility that classification might yet,
under the court of appeals' decision, be permitted under some circumstances; but
it is not altogether improbable that the court was also foresightedly meditating
on the probability of other suits seeking, by an extension of the doctrine of the
court of appeals' decision, to prevent a reduction of the number of directors on
the board, or other devices which would have the effect of "qualifying" the cumulative voting right.23
In Wolfson v. Avery-s the conflict was between a constitutional provisione
which provided that directors or managers were to be elected cumulatively and
in no other manner and a statutory provisione which allowed classification of
directors. The constitutional provision for cumulative voting reads as follows:
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for
directors or managers of incorporated companies every stockholder shall
have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of

11.
12.
13.
Revised
1701.68,
14.
15.
16.

165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780 (1956).
Id. 133 N.E.2d at 789.
"Can it be said that the legislative intent in enacting Section 1701.58,
Code, was to limit Section 1701.64, Revised Code, and not limit Section
Revised Code, and other sections of the corporation act?" Id. at 788.
6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955) ; noted in 103 U. PA. L. Rzv. 822 (1955).
ILL. CONsT. art. 11, § 3.
ILL. Bus. CORP. act § 35.
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stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or
managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate
as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of
his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle
among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such directors or
managers shall not be elected in any other manner.
The board of directors was divided into three classes of three directors each, and
one class was to be elected each year for a term of three years. The defendant
contended that the constitutional guarantee extended only to the directors "to
be elected," i.e., that the right to vote cumulatively was not absolute but was dependent upon a number of factors, including the number of directors in the corporation. While recognizing that the constitutional provision does not insure a
voting strength in exact proportion to the number of shares held, the majority
of the court nevertheless held that the statute authorizing classification was a
substantial denial of the constitutional right of the shareholder to cumulate his
votes. It is interesting to note that the fllinois Legislature attempted to avoid
the conflict by providing for a minimum of three directors in each class."T Thus
while the effectiveness of cumulative voting could be modified, it could not be
destroyed by classification.
Evaluating these two cases, it would appear that had the appeal court's decision in the Humphrys case been allowed to stand, the case would have offered
little authority for a case arising under Missouri law. The Ohio Court of Appeals
was able to avoid a direct holding that classification necessarily conflicted with
the cumulative voting privilege by statutory interpretation. Although based on
statutory interpretation, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision lends persuasive force
to the argument that the cumulative right-whether given by statute or constitution-does not extend to guaranteeing the effectiveness of the cumulative right.,
While it is true that the court in the Wolfson case based its opinion in part on the
language of the Illinois Constitution, the case also offers the first clear-cut holding
that classification is void as being contrary to the purpose of the cumulative provision. The two cases illustrate two essentially divergent views: In the Humphrys case the right was distinguished from the effectiveness of the exercise of
that right; whereas in the Wolfson case the court looked upon the right as guaranteeing minority representation.-' Whether classification should be void as contrary
to the Missouri Constitutional provision for cumulative voting constitutes the problem of this paper.
In the vast majority of law review comments on the subject the invalidity
of classification has been assumed. In some of these comments this conclusion

17. Ibid.
18. Oni0 Rav. CODE § 1701.57 was enacted after the court of appeals' decision
to provide for at least three directors in each class.
19. Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 14, 126 N.E.2d at 707: "The guaranty of
minority representation prohibits any law which in effect defeats or nullifies it,
even though such law does not in express terms attempt ito nullify the right."
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has been reached with little, consideration of the factors involved2o

The shareholder is given the right to vote cumulatively. Classification destroys or qualifies
this right. Since the cumulative right is given by the constitution, classification
is void. This technique of reasoning fails to consider that the right to vote cumulatively exists only by virtue of a statutory or constitutional provision and that
the extent of that right may only be determined with reference to the specific
provision in question. The Missouri provision, on its face, only purports to guarantee the right to vote cumulatively in elections for more than one director. A
guarantee of the right to vote cumulatively is not a guarantee of the right of
minority representation.Few would argue that a corporation may not within
the statutory limit determine the number of directors,22 although to reduce the
number of directors from nine to three just as effectively destroys the effectiveness
of cumulative voting as would classification of a nine-director board into three
classes.

Classification does not, in a technical sense, eliminate the right to vote

cumulatively; although, in a practical sense, it can make the right an empty
one for smaller minority groups. -:3 It is undoubtedly true that the drafters of
the provision might have made the right an absolute one so that any device which
destroyed or weakened the right would be void. An examination of devices which
have the effect of either destroying or qualifying the right to vote cumulatively
reveals a most interesting probability.
It is submitted that whether or not a particular device will be struck down
as violative of the purpose of the constitutional provision should depend, and to
a large extent does depend, on whether the device is useful only as a means of
avoiding the effect of the cumulative provision or whether or not the device has
some intrinsically useful and legitimate purpose. It is submitted that the cases
support this hypothesis.
Thus in Wright v. Central California Colony Water Co., 24 the court held that
a resolution permitting separate elections for each of the corporation's seven directors was violative of the cumulative voting provision. In Alliance Co-op. Ins.
Co. v. Gasche's the court held that where the statute and bylaws provide for cumulative voting, it is proper for the presiding officer to refuse to put a motion to

20. See 24 U. CIN. L. REv. 560, 567 (1955), where the author states: "Fundamentally, then, when a Hegelian dialectic problem arises from the co-existence of
a constitutional provision guaranteeing cumulative voting rights and a statute
permitting the use of staggered voting, the court may reach a synthesis merely
by asking itself: 'Do we choose to enforce the constitutional mandate or not?'
Concurrence must inevitably (emphasis added) fall in favor of the superiority
of the constitutional provision."
21. Maddock v. Vorelone Corporation, 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (1929).
22. But see Bowes and De Bow, s-upra. note 1, at 366 (suggesting contra but
citing no cases).
23. Williams, op. cit. supra note 1.
24. 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).
25. 93 Kan. 147, 142 Pac. 882 (1914).
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elect them singly. Obviously no useful purpose is served by having separate
elections for each director, and for this reason the device is void as being contrary
to the cumulative voting right. Similarly in In re Rogers Imports, Inc." a bylaw
authorizing removal without cause was held to violate the cumulative voting provision in the corporation charter. Again the device has no useful purpose other
than to frustrate the cumulative voting provision by removing directors elected by
a minority. Contrariwise, in Horton v. Wilder- where a statute authorized cumulative voting and another statute required that at least three directors be residents
of the state, the court held that the three directors receiving a very few cumulative
votes were elected over non-residents receiving more cumulative votes. Obviously
the state has a definite interest in insuring a certain number of resident directors,
and thus, although the effect is to weaken the effectiveness of the cumulative
right, the useful purpose served justifies the imposition. Reducing the number
of directors, likewise, may be motivated by legitimate reasons. A large board may
be found to be too cumbersome or expensive. No case has been found which has
held that a board reduction violates the cumulative voting provision of the state,
although the effect is to reduce the efficacy of the shareholder's right to vote
cumulatively.23
Viewed in this light, it would seem that classification would not be inconsistent
with the cumulative voting provision. It is not without significance that of 1000
domestic corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 142 elect their
directors by classes and, of these, 61 have cumulative voting.," Classification
insures that at all times there will be some experienced directors. Classification
contributes to stability and continuity of corporate policy."0 These are very real
and important considerations to many corporations. An extension of the logic of
the decided cases would indicate no incompatibility between classification and
cumulative voting for classification has a legitimate purpose irrespective of its
effect on cumulative voting.
At first impression, the Wolfsou case would seem to contradict the foregoing
analysis. However, the Wolfson case was based on the particular wording of the
Illinois Constitution. A careful examination of the Illinois and Missouri provisions
reveals, what may be significant differences.-

26. 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
27. 48 Kan. 222, 29 Pac. 566 (1892).
28. Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y. Supp. 425
(1st Dep't 1910) allows such reduction.
29.1 Williams op. cit. supra note 1, at 49.
30. i Id.
31. A difference which was once commented on by the Illinois court in People
ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922), a
case in which the court held that their cumulative provision prohibited the issuance
of preferred non-voting stock. It is interesting to note that in State v. Swanger,
190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872 (1905), 17 KAN. CiTy L. Rnv. 66 (1948), the Missouri
Supreme Court gave a more flexible interpretation of the cumulative provision in
upholding the right of the corporation to issue non-voting preferred stock.
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The Illinois Constitution gives the shareholder the right "to cumulate said
shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors multiplied
by the number of his shares." "Directors," it was argued, referred back to
"directors or managers to be elected," and where the section speaks of the number
of directors, it means the number of directors to be elected. It should be noticed
that the Illinois provision is divided into two clauses. The first gives the shareholder the right to vote his stock for the directors to be elected, and the second
provides for cumulative voting. Thus the court was able to construe "number of
directors" in the second clause without the qualifying phrase "to be elected" of
the first clause being read in. The court held, therefore, that when the constitution
states that shares multiplied by directors equals votes, it must mean the total
number of directors shall be the multiplier; for it would be a strained construction
to say that directors meant more than one but less than the whole. It would also
be illogical to suppose, the majority thought, that the total number of directors
should be used in computing the number of votes without also holding that the
total number of directors should be elected at the same time.
The Missouri Constitution gives the cumulative right in all elections for directors. The use of the plural suggests that the cumulative provision shall apply
only to those elections where more than one director is to be elected.ns This seems'
realistic when it is remembered that cumulative voting has no advantages when
only one director is to be elected.The section then provides that the shareholder may distribute such votes
among two or more candidates. The particular wording used provides some basis
for arguing that the shareholder has a right to vote cumulatively for two or more
candidates. In other words, it is arguable that in all cases the shareholder has
the right to vote for at least three candidates. A more likely argument, however,

32. Mo. Ray. STAT. § 351.320 (1949) purports to give directors the right to
fill vacancies on the board of directors until the holding of a stockholder election.
Several questions of interest arise under this section. Does the appointment by
surviving directors violate the cumulative voting provision of the constitution?
The answer would seem to be no. The cumulative provision, on its face, does not
purport to cover anything but stockholder elections for directors. But see People
ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 59 (1930), where the Illinois court
again gave an extremely broad interpretation to the cumulative provision in denying the validity of such appointments. Does the Missouri statute authorize a
special election? There are no cases on this, but the reference to "an" election
indicates that the shareholders need not wait until the next annual election. If
the statute authorizes a special election to fill a vacancy, would that violate the
cumulative provision of the constitution? If only one vacancy exists, the answer
is clearly no. If there are two vacancies, it is arguable that cumulative voting
must be used. These problems are beyond the scope of this paper except in so far
as they emphasize the historically different approaches of the Illinois and Missouri
Supreme Courts' interpretations of their respective cumulative provisions.
33. Notice that although the Missouri statute provides for a minimum number of three directors, the constitution puts no minimum limit on the number of
directors.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/9

8

et al.: Editorial
REVIEW
LAWBoard/Comments
MISSOURI

(Vol. 22

would seem to be that the words are directory in telling the shareholder how he
may distribute his votes if there are more than two candidates. It should be
emphasized that a candidate is not a director. There may be a number of candidates for one directorship. If the drafters of the constitution wished to provide
that the minimum number of directors must be more than two, this was indeed a
strange and doubtful manner of doing so. The prohibitive section which follows,
that such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other manner, must be
construed along with the first line in the section. That line, it is submitted, sets
out the limits of the mandatory cumulative provision, i.e., the provision only applies
in an election for directors, not in an election for a director. Thus the use of the
plural throughout the section merely refers to the fact that the cumulative provision applies only to cases where more than one director is up for election.
Not! only does a fair interpretation of the Missouri Constitutional provision
not require all directors to be elected at one time, but also it would seem that the
provision affirmatively contemplates that less than the whole may be elected at
one time. The Missouri provision specifically states that the manner of determining the number of votes shall be the number of shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. If the Illinois Court was able to construe "number
of directors" without the qualifying phrase "to be elected," the Missouri Court
will find that task impossible. If "to be elected" is to have any meaning, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that this meaning embraces the possibility of less
than the whole number of directors being elected at one time. It is possible to
argue that the words "to be elected" are neutral and are merely used to describe
persons in future elections, so that if a corporate board is increased or decreased
in size, the new number of directors rather than the original number is to be
chosen.a, This argument fails to explain how the words "directors to be elected"
are a more clear indication that the number of corporate directors at the time of
election is intended than is the single word "director"." Consider the reasoning
adopted in the Wolfson case that it would be an unnatural interpretation to say
that the provision contemplated that the whole number of directors be used in
computing the number of votes per share and not also hold that the provision
contemplated election of the -total number of directors. Applying this reasoning
conversely, it would be an unnatural interpretation to hold that the Missouri provision contemplates that the number of directors to be elected shall be used in
computing votes per share and not also hold that the section contemplates that if
less than all the directors may be used in computing votes, then less than all the
directors may be elected at that election.

34. An argument which the Illinois court apparently did not accept.
35. Mo. CONST. 1875, art. 12 § 6 and Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.245 (1949) use
-the words "to be elected at such election." It is doubtful that the deletion of "at
such election" by the 1945 Constitution is significant.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

9

1957]

MissouriCOMMENTS
Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1957], Art. 9

The view here presented may be summarized as follows:
1. In all elections for more than one director cumulative voting shall
be used. In an election for one director, cumulative voting is not required.
2. The constant reference to directors and managers in -theplural has
no significance bey 9 nd the fact that the cumulative provision has no application in an election where only one vacancy exists.
3. The provision that the shareholder shall have the right to cast his
votes for one candidate or distribute such votes among two or more candidates does not give the shareholder an absolute right to have more than
two candidates for which to cast his votes; rather the language is directory in informing the shareholder how he may distribute his votes if
there are two or more candidates up for election.
4. The Illinois and Missouri provisions are distinguishable.
souri provision does not prohibit classification.

The Mis-

5. The language which gives the shareholder a number of votes equal
to the number of shares held multiplied by the number of directors to be
elected indicates that the section affirmatively contemplates that less than
the whole number of directors may be elected at one time.
The fact that the cumulative provision occurs in the Missouri Constitution
signifies a strong state policy toward the right The wisdom of making the right
a constitutional one is dubious. By so doing any changes to meet new circumstances are bound to be slow and uncertain. It is submitted that an inflexible interpretation of the constitutional provision is undesirable. An interpretation consistent with the language of the section is adequate and would enable the legislature to meet the abuses of classification by appropriate and speedy legislation.-e
Policy considerations to not require a rigid and stultifying construction. Both
the cumulative voting right and the provision for classification serve useful ends.
Their simultaneous existence is to be desired.
WALTER F. MOUDY

36. For statutes limiting the right of classification to protect cumulative voting rights, see CAL. CORP. CODO §§ 805, 2235, Wis. BUS. CORP. LAw, 1951, § 180.33;
Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MIC11. L. REV. 1291, 1307
(1953). Only Alabama, California, and Wyoming insist that a full slate of directors be elected annually.
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IEDERAL TORT CILA1Ms ACT: A MORE LIBERAL APPROACH INDICATED
I

1
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND WAIVER

In the sixteenth century it became fully established at common law that the
king was immune to suit for his wrongs, although this immunity was generally
qualified by the responsibility of some minister for the king's action.n When the
concept of the individual sovereign was replaced in this country by the idea of
a sovereign republican state within a sovereign federal republic, the principal of
the immunity of the sovereign remained. 2 The basis for the continuance of this
principle seems to be the idea that to permit the government to be sued without
its consent would be inconsistent with the concept of supreme executive power.'
Provision was expressly made in the United States Constitution to protect the
several states from suit without their consent.' As a matter of international
comity, this immunity has been extended to foreign nations,4 including their ministers,- agencies,8 and public property,' and to the United Nations.lo It has also

1. For a general discussion of governmental immunity to tort liability, see
Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 221 (1934); 36
YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1936) ; 28 CoL. L. REV. 577, 734 (1938) ; Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Government Liability in Tort: A ComparativeSurvey, 9 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 191 (1942).

2. HOLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol. 3, pp. 462-469, Vol. 6, pp.
226-267 (4th Ed. 1935). The rule appears to have been based upon the then prevailing idea that the King could do no wrong, seemingly derived from the concept
of rule by divine right.
3. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824); Lewis
v. State, 48 Am. Rep. 607, 96 N.Y. 71 (1884) ; Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593
(1893); Sultzback Clothing Co. v. United States, 10 F.2d 363 (W.D.N.Y. 1925).
See also Leflar and Kantorwitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363
(1954).
4. As Mr. Justice Holmes so aptly put it, in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907):

".

..

a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any

formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal rights as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends." See also Briggs v. Light Boat Upper Cedar Point, 11 Allen
(Mass.) 157, 162 (1865).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XL
6. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 Fed. 261 (2d Cir. 1908),
aff'd. 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Sullivan v. State of Sao Paolo (Brazil), 122 F.2d 335
(2d Cir. 1941), noted 40 MIcH. L. REV. 911 (1942).
7. Bergson v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948), noted 22 So. CAL. L.
REV. 491 (1949).
8. Telkes v. Hungarian Nat. Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 38 N.Y.S.2d 419
(lst Dep't. 1942). See also 50 YALE L.J. 1088 (1941) ; 59 YALE L.J. 176 (1948).
9. Compania Espanola v. The Novemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Riesenfeld,
Sovereign Immunity of ForeignVessels, 25 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1940).
10. Tsiang v. Tsiang, 194 Misc. 259, 86 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; noted
in 49 MIcH. L. REV. 1244 (1951).
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been extended to political subdivisions below the level of the state, including municipal corporations when acting in their "governmental" or "political" capacities,
but not when acting in their "corporate" or "proprietary" capacities."
A variety of reasons have been advanced to explain why a government should
not be liable for its torts. The immunity has been based upon considerations of
public policy, upon the idea that no matter what the wrongful act of the agent,
he is outside his scope of employment for the state, upon the theory that whatever
the state does must be lawful, and upon the impossibility of a wrong committed by
an entire people.12 Unquestionaby, however, there is a need for legislative
waiver of this immunity today as there has never been in the past. Governments,
their agencies and subdivisions, are today operating the instrumentalities of our
advanced technical civilization in carrying out their greatly enlarged multiplicity
of functions, and, as a consequence, they are subjecting the public at large to
their torts in unprecedented numbers. This has created a definite social demand
for a governmental responsibility which cannot be achieved by adhering to outmoded principles of law from another era.'3
The legislatures of a few states have moved to answer this demand by enacting statutes creating general state liability for tort, the procedural mechanics set
up by these statutes varying greatly." However, in many states, even where the
legislature has purported to remove this cloak of immunity by statute, the courts

1. 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.23 (3d Ed. 1950); Smith,

Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1949).

The immunity of the state was first determined to include municipal corporations in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798).
There has always been a great difficulty confronting the courts when making
a distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions, and the tests
employed in the various jurisdictions to make the distinction have not been altogether uniform. Neither have the results been consistent. For examples of disharmony, see Haley v. Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 77 N.E. 888 (1906); Williams v.
City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Irvin v. Greenwood, 89 S.C.
511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911); Borchard, supra note 1, 34 YALE L.J. at 129. See also
Indian Towing Co. Inc. v. United States, 250 U.S. 61 (1955) note 1.
12. Passim, Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884) ; Bourn v. Hart, 93
Cal. 321, 28 Pac. 951 (1892).
13. "It is bad social engineering to administer justice to a blueprint of a
society of the past as a means of maintaining the jural postulates of civilization in
a different society of the present." POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIc THEORY 83
(1940).
President Lincoln was moved by much the same considerations to propose
legislation to create federal tort liability in his annual message to Congress, Dec.
3, 1861, when he said: "It is as much the duty of the Government to render prompt
justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between
private individuals."

RICHARDSON, 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,

1789-1897, 51 (1898).
14. Nutting, Legislative Practices Regarding Tort Claims Against the State,
4 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1939). See also Leflar and Kantrowitz, supra note 3; Shumate,
Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 L 4w & CONTEMP. PROB. 242 (1942).
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have adhered to the former reasoning set forth in the above paragraph, and have
refused to hold the state liable in tort."
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT"a
A. General Legislative History

Although prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal
government had waived certain of its immunities in other fields of claims and litigation, it was perfectly clear that it had not done so in the general field of tort
liability.7 Instances of hardship and injustice due to torts committed by the
federal government and its agencies were relieved only by the haphazard and
often injudicious method of special appropriation legislation, which also constituted a burden on the legislators.
Beginning with President Lincoln's recommendations in 1861 that the government's tort immunity be waived,

8

there has been almost constant activity in sup-

port of the waiver of the immunity of the federal government in tort, and toward
the creation of a judicial process to dispose of claims arising against the United
States."0 The first bill providing for such waiver reached the Congressional floor

15. Thompson v. State, 4 Ill. Ct. Cl. 26 (1921) ; Shear v. State, 117 Neb. 865,
223 N.W. 130 (1929); Miller v. State, 231 App. Div. 363, 247 N.Y.Supp. 399 (3d
Dep't. 1931); Smith v. State, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920). See Note, 5
CORN. L.Q. 340 (1920), where it is suggested that perhaps the claimant was authorized to sue under such a statute for his own self amusement, in view of the
fact that its purpose was apparently not to create liability.
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346 (b) (c) (d), 1402 (b), 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680 (1952).
For general discussion and interpretation of the Act, see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation,35 Gao. L.J. 1 (1946); Anderson, Recovery from the United States Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 31
MINN. L. REv. 456 (1947); Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Action Against the Federal
Government, 47 CAL. L. REV. 722 (1947); Baer, Suing Uncle Sam In Tort, 26 N.C.
L. RaY. 119 (1948); Hulen, Suits on Tort Claims Against the United States, 7
F.R.D. 649 (1948); Yankwich, Problems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9
F.R.D. 143 (1949); Gellhorn and Lauer, FederalLiability for Personaland Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1325 (1954); Fisher, The Federal Tort Claims
Act After Five Years, 3 MERcER L. REv. 363 (1954) ; Gerwig, A Decade of Litigation Under the FederalTort Claims Act, 24 TENN. L. REv. 301 (1956). (In chronological order)
17. Hill v. United States, supra note 3; Sultzback Clothing Co. v. United
States, supranote 3; Gottlieb, Tort Claims Against the United States, 30 GEo. L.J.
462 (1942); Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 311 (1942).
18. Supra note 13.
19. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550, note 8 (1951), for
a chronological outline of legislation illustrating the trend toward expansion in
the -waiverof governmental immunity.
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in 1919,20 and between 1925 and 1935, some eighteen such bills were introduced
in Congress.-1
In 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act was at last enacted into positive law as
Title IV of the Omnibus Legislative Reorganization Act of that year.22 Its alleged
purpose was two-fold, to constitute a waiver of federal tort liability immunity, and
to alleviate the burden of private relief bills imposed upon Congress.22 Since its
passage, it has been substantially amended four times, once in 1947,34 twice in
1949,m5 and once as a part of the Public Vessels and Suits in Admiralty Act of
1920 and 1925.12
B. Statutes Other than the Federal Tort Claims Act Which Affect the
Tort Liability of the United States
1. Maritime Claims
When the Federal Tort Claims Act was first enacted, the United States was
liable under its provisions for certain claims arising out of maritime incidents.
Since 1948, however, the Public Vessels and Suits in Admiralty Act-, has been
made the exclusive remedy for claims of this nature.2s
2. Claims of Federal Employees
The Federal Employees Compensation Act was liberalized by amendment in
1949,2o with a view to making it the exclusive remedy for claims of that natureso
It has been interpreted to preclude a federal employee from any remedy, including
relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act, other than the administrative process
described in that Act.21

20. H.R. 14737, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919).
21. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51, note 2 (1949).
22. Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, §§ 401-424, 60 STAT. 842-847.
23. Senate HearingsBefore Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 5 (1940) ; Sen. Rep. No. 1011, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.,
p. 25 (1946).
24. 61 STAT. 722 (1947), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
25. 63 STAT. 62 (1949); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1952); and 63 STAT. 444
(1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(m) (1952).
26. 62 STAT. 496 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1952).
27. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-762, 781-799 (1952); 46 U.S.C. Supp. II §§ 752, 790
(1952).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 2680 (d) (1952) provides that the act shall not extend to
"any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title
46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States."
29. 63 STAT. 854, 861 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 757 (1952).
30. See Senate Report No. 836, to accompany H.R. 3191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949).
31. Underwood v. United States, 207 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1953). Cf. Thal v.
United States, 218 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1954).
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C. Construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act
1. Jurisdiction
Original jurisdiction is granted to the district courts exclusively to entertain
suits involving the tort liability of the United States under the Act31 This includes jurisdiction to adjudicate any set-off or counterclaim by the United States."0
Suits, under the Act, are authorized to be filed only in the district wherein the
claimant resides, or within the district wherein the actionable wrong occurred.",
The courts are expressly denied jurisdiction of claims arising in foreign countries.2r,
This latter provision has given rise to the problem of ascertaining when the
claim has arisen in a foreign country. The Supreme Court, in United States W.
Spelara, has seemingly ruled that the determination should be based upon sovereignty: ie. if the United States merely has possession of the soil (even for an
extended period) where the claim arises, then it is in a foreign country; but if
the United States is sovereign on that land, then the claim falls without the exclusion and is actionable.,
The question has also been presented for determination as to whether or not
the availability of a remedy and relief from the government under another statute

32. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)

(1952), provides that

"...

the district courts, to-

gether with the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, !shall have exclusive jurisdiction on claims against the United States
."
(Emphasis added) Under the definitive section, courts of the United
States include those of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and thus jurisdiction under the
Act is extended to the district courts in those two jurisdictions. 28 U.S.C. § 451
(1952).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (c) (1952).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (b) (1952).
35. 128 U.S.C. § 2680 (k) (1952).
36. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949). Here, claimant filed suit
in her resident district court to recover damages for the death of her husband who
was killed at a United States air base in Newfoundland, basing her action upon
a Newfoundland wrongful death statute. The air base had been leased for a
.period of 99 years from Britain. The action was dismissed by the trial court for
want of jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (k). Spelar v. United States, 75
F. Supp. 1967 (E.D. N.Y. 1948), reversed 171 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1948).
37. The court also based its conclusion in the case upon the legislative history
of the act and upon a canon of construction which "teaches that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. . .

."

338 U.S. at 223.

The court of appeals apparently had based its decision upon Vermilya Brown
Co. v. Connel, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), which had construed a similar statutory provision contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952), as not
to preclude its application to a.base on similar lease in Bermuda.
For a general exhortation on the applicability of Congressional enactments
to foreign soil possessed or controlled by the United States, see 68 HARV. L. Rnv.
781 (1955).
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deprives the district courts of jurisdiction to entertain a claim based upon the
same cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. As has already been
pointed out, in the case of claims falling within the scope of the Public Vessels and
Suits in Admiralty Act, there can be no recovery under the former act. This is
based upon an express exclusion contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act itself."9
In the case of Underwood v. United States, already mentioned, it was held that
cases covered by the Federal Employee's Compensation Act were excluded from
the Federal Tort Claims Act,89 but in this instance the result was rested upon
the intent of Congress,"0 and not upon an express exclusion. A contrary result
was reached in United States v. Brown," where a veteran was allowed recovery for
injuries due to negligent treatment by a Veterans Administration physician, although he had received an award for the same injury under a veterans compensation statute."2 The Brown case pointed out that, of course, the amount of recovery was reduced by the amount he received under the other award. It would
at least seem arguable that the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterum is applicable, and that Congress, by expressly excluding claims which fall within the
coverage of the Public Vessels and Suits in Admiralty Act from the operation of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 3 indicated an intention that the Federal Tort Claims
Act should cover all other claims which might also fall within the scope of other
remedial statutes where cases under them are not expressly excluded in the Federal Tort Claims Act itself." On the other hand, it may be claimed that all other
acts giving tort jurisdiction should preclude recovery under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, since Title 28, section 1346 (b) of the United States Code relates only
to cases over which district courts have exclusive jurisdiction and the district
courts would not have exclusive jurisdiction within the meaning of that section

38. See note 28, supra.
39. See note 31, supra.
40. See note 30, supra.
41. 348 U.S. 110 (1954), affirming Brown v. United States, 209 F.2d 403
(2d Cir. 1954). Accord, Rufino v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 10 (D.C. N.Y. 1954);
Perucki v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 959 (D.C. Pa. 1948).
A like result was reached, based on Congressional intent, where plaintiffs had
received recovery under the Military Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 223 (b) and (c)
(1952), in United States v. Wade, 170 F.2d 298 (C.A. Mass. 1948).
The dissent, in the Brown case, argued that Feres v. United States, 337 U.S.
49 (1949), controlled. The Feres case had held that military personnel cannot
be compensated under the F.T.C.A. for injuries received in the course of duty.
Assuming the Feres case to be sound, however, the argument is implausible. Even
though the injuries originated out of World War II, the claim sought damages for
an injury which was due to the negligence of a V.A. physician, which arose long
after the soldier-government relationship had ceased. Notwithstanding that the
government was gratuitously providing this service, no relationship existed other
than patient-physician, and the usual common law was applicable to the claim if
the compensation statute did not preclude the suit.
42. 36 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1952).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1952).
44. Cf. Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914 (D.C. Wis. 1947).
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5
where other statutes give other bodies jurisdiction." In light of these two conflicting possibilities of construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act, it would appear
that the court has, in so far as it can be determined, reached a sound position in
deciding that, in the absence of an express exclusion in the Federal Tort Claims
Act itself, the congressional intent in passing another remedial statute should
determine whether or not that remedial statute creates a sole remedy to the exclusion of recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Under this position the
Congressional intent may be discovered either expressly or by implication in the
remedial statute itself, from the legislative records and history of its legislative
journey.

2. Parties
The Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes any claimant to become a party plaintiff where that claimant has an action authorized under the liability provisions
of the statute."6 The Act has been construed, in light of the Federal Assignment
Act,7 to permit a suit to be maintained by a subrogee of the claimant in his own
name as subrogee, if the assignment was involuntary."a
Clearly, under the provisions of the Act, the United States is required to be
a party to all litigation brought by authority of the Act." Thus, even though a federal corporation has authority to sue and be sued in its own name, for the purposes
of claims based on the Federal Tort Claims Act, it must be sued as an agency of

45. See note 32 supra.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952) authorizes the district court to take jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused in a certain manner. 28 U.S.C. §
1402(b) authorizes the plaintiff under the former provision to prosecute his action
in prescribed jurisdictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952) makes it clear that where
one is injured by the death of another, within the meaning of any wrongful death
statute, he is entitled to be a party plaintiff.
47. 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1952).
48. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949). Hero,
the insurance company, who had insured a claim for injuries suffered by reason
of the negligence of a postal worker was allowed to sue the United States in
its own name on its subrogation of the bank employee's claim.
The case has been cited by the court as authority for a liberal construction of
the Act in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., supra note 19.
Insurance Co. of North America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951 (D.C. Va.
1948), held that the failure to include subrogated insurers in the exceptions contained in § 2680 of the Act evidenced Congressional intent not to exclude such
insurers from suit under the Act. See also the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955).
49. The titles of various sections of the act make this clear: e.g. § 1346,
United States as defendant; § 1402, United States as defendant; § 2401, Time for
commencing action against United States; and etc.
The government may be named as a third party plaintiff or as a third party
defendant where liability arises under the Act. United States v. State of Arizona,
214 F.2d 389 (C.A. Ariz. 1954).
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the federal government, and the United States must be named as a party defendant to the action.50
It has been determined that the United States may be impleaded as a thirdparty defendant and held liable for contribution as a joint tortfeasor where such
a joinder is permitted by the local law.5, The United States may receive contribution on the same basis from a citizen who is a joint tortfeasor.oz
Where, however, the government is sued under the Act for the negligence of
one of its employees, it may not lodge a third-party complaint against the negligent
employee in order to recover indemnification for its liability, nor may it sue to recover from the employee in a separate action."

50. Wickman v. Inland Waterways Corporation, 78 F. Supp. 284 (D.C. Minn.
1948).
51. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 540 U.S. 543 (1951); United States v.
State of Arizona, upra note 49.
In the Yellow Cab case, a taxicab collided with a mail truck, and a streetcar
collided with a military vehicle. Suits were brought in both cases by passengers,
and the United States was impleaded as a third party defendant. The court rejected any implication from the legislative history that such a result was not contemplated by Congress, and pointed out the injustice which would be inherent in
a situation where the United States could join a citizen and the citizen could not
do the same. The opinion concluded that the F.T.C.A. made the federal rule for
third party practice applicable in the case at bar.
It has been held that the Act, in providing that the United States is to be
treated as any other tortfeasor, made the federal rules of civil procedure applicable to the government. Bently v. United States 16 F.R.D. 237 (D.C. Ga. 1954);
Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (D.C. La. 1950).
The Yellow Cab case has been cited as authority for the converse proposition
that jurisdiction exists under the Act to allow an affirmative judgment for the
United States on a counterclaim. United States v. New York City Omnibus Corp.,
128 F. Supp. 86 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
52. Russell v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 353 (D.C. Pa. 1953); Showers v.
United States, 113 F. Supp. 350 (D.C. Pa. 1953).
53. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954); United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952).
In the Gilman case, a federal employee injured complainant, who sued the
government. The government filed a third party complaint against the employee
and recovered judgment over against the latter for the amount of its liability.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this judgment on the basis of § 2676 of the
Act, which provides for the extinguishment of the liability of the employee upon
recovery of judgment against the United States. 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953).
It might be noted that § 2676 only purports to extinguish this liability as to
the claimant. The decision of the court of appeals is criticized by Prof. Seavey in
67 HARV.L. Rnv. 994, 1001 (1954).
On appeal, the court, by unanimous decision, affirmed the court of appeals,
but upon a different basis. Determining that there was no express authority for
such indemnity given by Congress, the court concluded that it could not be found
by reference to the common law due to the unique relationship between the government and its employees.
This overruled an earlier district court decision to the contrary in Burks v.
United States, 116 F. Supp. 337 (D.C. Tex. 1953).
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3. Limitation and Bars to Action
(a)

Statute of Limitations

The original one year limitation contained in the Act was amended in 1949,"
and extended to two years in order to make it more in accord with other prevailing
statutes of limitation.- Thus, while a claimant sues the United States on the
basis of local negligence law under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the duration accorded to him in which he may bring an action is controlled by the two year limitation provision contained in the Act, excluding any application of a local time
limit.we The action, for this purpose, is viewed as accruing on the date of the injury, and not when the act of negligence occurs, if there is any discrepancy between these two occurrences.- The time limitation contained in this provision,
however, does not apply to the bringing of a counterclaim where suit is filed by
the government; 58 and where a proper party has already filed suit, the real party
in interest may enter that suit after two years has run.39
There has been a conflict in the decisions of the lower courts regarding
whether or not the statute of limitations continues to run against a claim when the
claimant is prevented from bringing his action for various reasons, such as disability or absence from the United States. One district court has held that the
two-year statute applies without exception." In another district, however, it has
been held that a claimant has three years after the termination of his disability
in which to bring his action. ol These two decisions cannot be reconciled, and a

54. 63 STAT. 62 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (1952), providing: "A tort claim
against the United States shall be forever barred unless action is begun within
two years after such claim accrues or within one year after the date of
enactment of this amendatory sentence, whichever is later, . . .
55. It was found by the House Committee on Judiciary that the then combined
average of state statutes of limitation (including the District of Columbia) was
2.92 years, and that those contained in other federal tort statutes averaged 2.2
years. U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 1949, Vol.2, p. 1226,, 81st Cong., H. R. 276, March
21, 19491
56. Foote v. Public Housing Commissioner of the United States, 107 F. Supp.
270 (W. Mich. 1952).
57. 'Games v. United States, 186 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1951), where the act
complained of took place on March 22, 1944, but the injury thereby caused did
not arise until February 2, 1945. Held, the action accrued on the latter date.
See also Bizer v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (D.C. Cal. 1954).
58. United States v. Capital Transit Co., 108 F. Supp. 348 (D.C. 1952).
59. Wallis v. United States, 102 F. Supp 211 (D.C. N.C. 1952).
60. Whalen v United States, 107 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
61. Glenn v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1955). This result
was achieved by construing together 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (a), which provides for a
general six year limitation on civil actions against the United States, but which
also makes provision for persons under a disability or beyond the seas, when the
claim accrues, to sue within three years after the termination of the disability,
and 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b), which provides the two year tort limitation. The court
indicated that a revision, which combined the two once independent provisions, demanded that they be read together.
The result in the instant case seems manifestly more just than that in Whalen
v. United States, supra note 60, although the reasons presented are not strong.
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decision by a higher court will be required to determine the problem.
If a claimant, on a claim for less than $1000, properly presents it for administrative adjustment with the proper agency, then he has six months after final
disposition of the claim by the agency, or withdrawal of the claim from the agency's
consideration, in which to begin his action.6(b)

Other limitations

When a claim has been filed for administrative adjustment, action may not
thereafter be brought on that claim unless it is withdrawn first, by giving fifteen
days notice to the agency.es
Where a claim has been submitted to an agency for administrative adjustment,
an action may not thereafter be instituted for a sum in excess of the claim presented to the agency, unless there is new evidence not reasonably discoverable at
the time the claim was presented to the agency.G"
(c)

Bars to action

Any judgment received on a claim under the act constitutes a complete bar to
a subsequent action on the same subject matter, both for the government and for
the employee." Any administrative award, compromise, or settlement has the
same effect." Where a release is given, the validity, of that instrument should
be determined under the law of the locale where it is given, unless it was given
with a view to performance somewhere else.07
4. The Basis of Liability
In order to create liability on the part of the United States, two distinct and
reasonably separable elements must appear from the Federal Tort Claims Act.
First., the wrongful conduct complained of must have been committed by an employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.
Secondly, he must have caused some injury to person or property, or death, by
some negligent or wrongful act or omission under circumstances where if a private
person had committed a like act or omission, he would be liable in accordance with

62. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1952).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1952).
64. 28 U.S.C. 2675 (b) (1952). See Gordon v. United States, 129 F. Supp.
371 (D.C. Mass. 1955), where a claimant had refiled an administrative claim and
was subsequently prohibited from maintaining an action for damages in excess of
the sum of that claim. Accord: Henson v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 148 (D.C.
Mo. 1949).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1952).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1952).
67. See Air Transport Associate v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1955) ; Rushford v. United States, 204 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953).
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the law of the place wherein it occurred.63
(a)

Agency

Liability having been made dependent upon the offending person being an
employee of the government, the Federal Tort Claims Act has defined "employee
of the government" as ". . . officers or employees of any federal agency, members
of the military ...
and persons acting on behalf of any federal agency in an
official capacity, ....
,9
(1)

Federal agency

This limitation of the applicability of the Act to employees of federal agencies,
of course, raises the problem as to what is afederal agency. It is defined in the
Act as encompassing almost any instrumentality of the government except independent contractors.7o This definition has been held to be applicable to the administrative adjustment provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act only, however, and
is considered inapplicable to the liability provisions.-1 Thus, in distinguishing between a federal agency and an independent contractor, the determination has been
left largely to the courts. The results in the various adjudications concerning
this issue tend to indicate that two factors mainly regulate the identification of
an instrumentality of the federal government. These are that it has the power of
direction and control over the activity, and that it is the beneficiary or object of
the service rendered.",

68.1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1952).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952) (emphasis added).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952) provides that the term is to include "executive
departments and independent establishment of the United States, and corporations
primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States."
71. Douffas v. Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 644 (D.C. 1949).
72. (a) Cases where the federal government does not derive enough benefit,
nor exercise sufficient control over the activity to make the instrumentality a
governmental agency within the meaning of the act are: Clark v. United States,
218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954), where a railroad was seized by executive order for
the sole purpose of preventing strikes during a period of emergency; Lavitt v.
United States, 177 F.2d 627 (C.A. Conn. 1949), where inspectors were appointed
by a local committee to inspect stored crops in connection with application to the
Department of Agriculture and Marketing Administration for the purpose of
making a loan thereon; Faleni v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. N.Y.
1949), involving a Navy ship service department; and McCranie v. United
States, 199 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1952); Dover v. United States, 192 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir. 1951); Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1951); Lederhouse
v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. N.Y. 1954); Stacher v. United States,
101 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. S.C. 1952); Glasgow v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 213
(N.D. Ala. 1951); and Mackay v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 696 (D.C. Conn.
1949), involving National Guard units not called up by the federal government,
but which are under the direction of their respective states.
(b) Cases where the federal government does derive the benefit of the service
and does exercise sufficient control over the conduct of the activity are: State of
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(2)

Employee of the government

The problem of determining whose employee the offending person is has been
presented in a number of cases. Since the Federal Tort Claims Act only defines
the term as an employee of a federal agency, this determination has also been
left largely to the courts. The decisions have been in accordance with the common
law principles of agency for the most part. It has been held that the "loaned
servant" doctrine is applicable under the Act, but there has been some conflict concerning this.72 Apparently the test is whether or not the employee is primarily
serving the federal government when the tort is committed.-'
It has also been held that the United States may be liable where the negligence
of some employee is proven, but the employee is not identified, on the basis of res
ipsa loquitur.73

Md. for Use of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (C.A.
Md. 1949), where a real estate firm was engaged to take charge of apartment
houses leased by the Federal Public Housing Authority and was subject to detailed
supervision by the Authority; O'Toole v. United States, 206 F.2d (3d Cir. 1953),
involving the National Guard of the District of Columbia, which is under the federal chain of command; and Wickman v. Inland Waterways Corporation, supra
note 50, involving the Inland Waterways Corporation, a federal corporation.
(c) Cases which indicate that mere financial sponsoring of the activity is not
a controlling factor are cases involving instrumentalities sanctioned by the government, but not directly financed by Congressional appropriation, or the so called
"nonappropriated fund" activities. It has been held that a military base exchange
is an agency for the purposes of the act. Daniels v. Chanute Air Force Base Exchange, 127 F. Supp. 920 (E D. Ill. 1955). It has also been ruled by the Comptroller General that Post Exchanges and similar nonappropriated fund activities are
instrumentalities of the United States. 24 Comp. Gen. 771 (1945). A civilian
swimming pool on an Air Force base, which was constructed, maintained and
operated by government agents, was held to be a government agency. Brewer v.
United States, 108 F. Supp. 889 (D C. Ga. 1952).
73. Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1948).
See also Cobb
v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. La. 1948), where an R.O.T.C. instructor
was considered as a servant loaned to the school where he taught.
In Bellview v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 97 (D.C. Vt. 1954); and LaBombard
v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 294 (D.C. Vt. 1954), summary judgment the basis
of the loaned servant doctrine, was denied under similar circumstances.
In Roger v. Elrod, 125 F. Supp. 62 (D.C. Alaska 1954), where an airman was
acting for the base exchange, the government was held liable because he was an
employee of the United States, and not because the exchange was a governmental
agency.
74. Where a member of the National Guard is paid out of federal funds and
is primarily concerned with the maintenance of government owned equipment assigned to the unit, then he is a federal employee. United States v. Duncan, 197'
F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951).
Where, however, such an employee is actually performing a duty for the
National Guard unit, he is not, during that time, an employee of the government.
Watt v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
It has been determined that a federal district judge and his trustees in bankrupty are not employees of the government within the contemplation of the
F.T.C.A. Cromelin v. United States, 177 F.2d 275 (C.A. Ga. 1949).
75. United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952).
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Scope of employment

Since the only definition of scope of employment provided by the Act deals
with military personnel acting in the line of duty 6 a question which obviously
could not be determined under local law, it would seem fairly clear that local law
should control the determination of whether or not the employee, not a member of
the military personnel, was acting in the scope of employment when the tort was
committed under the liability provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act.71 There
is a conflict among the courts of appeals, however, which has not been resolved by
the Supreme Court, as to whether local or federal law should control this determination.78
Clearly, the United States cannot be held liable under the Act unless the
employee was acting within the scope of employment79 and for the purpose of
determining liability under the Act, "line of duty" and "scope of employment" are
synonymous. 80 It must be affirmatively established that the negligent employee
was acting within the scope of employment,81 and a mere showing of negligence

76. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952).
77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674 (1952), provides that the United States
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.
78. United States v. Lushbough, supra note 53. Five circuits have indicated
that state law should govern: Second Circuit: McConville v. United States, 179 F.
2d 680 (1952); Third Circuit: O'Toole v. United States, supra note 72; Fifth Circuit: Campbell v. United States, 172 F.2d 500 (1949); Sixth Circuit: Christian
v. United States, 184 F.2d 523 (1950); Ninth Circuit: Murphy v. United States,
179 F.2d 743 (1950) and United States v. Wilbye, 191 F.2d 181 (1951).
Three circuits have indicated that the federal law should govern: Fourth
Circuit: United States v. Eleaser, 177 F.2d 914 (1949), and United States v.
Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (1951) ; Fifth Circuit: Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7
(1949); Tenth Circuit: Williams v. United States, supra note 72, and United
States v. Holly, supra note 74.
It is noteworthy that in Williams v. United States, 215 F.2d 800, 807 (9th Cir.
1954), the court cited a case favoring the application of federal law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 348 U.S. 926 (1955), and remanded the case for
consideration of the state law on respondeat superior. 350 U.S. 857 (1955). This
may serve to indicate what the court may do when it is finally confronted with a
case requiring the determination of this question.
For an exhortation on this problem, see Scope of Employment Under the Federal Tort ClaimsAct, 23 TLNN. L. REv. 270 (1954).
79. King v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (C.A. Tex. 1949), cert. denied 839
U.S. 964, (1949); Baker v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 644 (D.C. D.C. 1955);
Murphy v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 345 (D.C. N.Y. 1953); United States v.
Eleazer, supra note 78; United States v. Sharpe, supra note 78; Rutherford v.
United States, 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947), aff'd mem. 168 F.2d 70 (6th Cir.
1948).
'S0. Leonard v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 694 (D.C. Wyo. 1955); O'Connell
v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 612 (D.C. Wash. 1953).
81. Campbell v. United States, supra note 78; Rolon v. United States, 119
F. Supp. 432 (D.C. Puerto Rico 1953). But see United States v. Hull, supra note
75.
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in the use of a government owned instrumentality is not sufficient. 82 The dangerous instrumentality and owners' liability doctrines have not been allowed to re8
lieve the plaintiff of this burden. 3
Where a privately owned instrumentality is used for the purpose of carrying
out an official duty, it does not prevent the employee from having acted within
the scope of employment, if the government can reasonably be assumed to have
contemplated its use.-' Where, however, this assumption cannot reasonably be
made, the United States will not be liable. 85
In the case of a deviation from instructions by an employee, if the deviation
is not a substantial one, the United States will be held liable."1 Where, however,
the deviation is so substantial that the employee has ceased to serve the master,
the government is relieved of liability.- After such a deviation, a re-entry into
the scope of employment will renew the government's liabilitys but only if the
employee is fit to resume his duties."9
The government may be liable for the use of force by the employee, and such
force will not remove the employee from the scope of employment, where the government may have reasonably contemplated that force would be used."0
Misleading actions of agents lawfully authorized to bind the United States
may estop the government from denying the effectiveness thereof, if they are within the scope of authority. But persons dealing with government agents are held
to have notice of the limits of their authority, and the government is not bound by
acts of agents beyond the scope thereof, nor is it liable to pay for benefits derived
therefrom.01

82. Curtis v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 912 (D.C. Cal. 1954). See also
Rolon v. United States, supra note 81, where proof that a mortar shell was
abandoned in a public road was not enough, in absence of showing that it was
left there by a government agent acting in the scope of employment.
83. Hubsch v. United States, supra note 78.
84. Purcello v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Satterwhite v. Bacelato, 130 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. N.C. 1955); Wilbye v. United States, 87
F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
85. Paly v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 798 (D.C. Md. 1954).
86. Murphey v. United States, supranote 78.
87. Spradley v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 292 (D.C: N.M. 1954).
88. Cf. McConville v. United States, supranote 78.
89. Rosa v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 623 (D.C. Hawaii 1954), where a
military driver, upon his re-entry into the limitations of employment, was sleepy
due to his drinking of beer. Held, the United States was not liable.
90. Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
91. Smale & Robinson, Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 457 (D.C. Cal.
1954). Here, the Director of Internal Revenue, who had authority to make rules
concerning the formalities to be observed in filing for a refund of excess profits
tax paid, misled a taxpayer into believing that a certain formality did not need
to be complied with. When the Director refused to make a refund because of
non-compliance, it was held that the government.was estopped to assert the formality.
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(b) The tort
Title 28, Section 1346 (b) of the United States Code provides that the district
courts shall have jurisdiction of claims against the United States for injury
"caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
government . . .under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." Section 2674 of that title provides: "The United
States shall be liable .. . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
person under like circumstances ....
One of the areas which has created the greatest confusion under the Federal
Tort Claims Act has been the construction and effect to be given to these two provisions. It seems fairly clear that Section 1346 (b) was intended to serve as a
test of liability only and does not go to the jurisdiction.92
(1)

Construction

The purpose of these provisions was to make the government liable, with
exceptions, for common law torts committed by its agents where a private individual would be liable."2 They were meant to describe the kind of liability intended
and not the limits of liability under Federal Tort Claims Act,- as some decisions
have erroneously supposed.- Thus, although it has been suggested that the provisions should be given a narrow construction favorable to the sovereign,06 it
seems sounder to hold that, in light of their beneficial purposes and definitive rather
than limiting nature, they should be given a liberal construction and the exceptions should be strictly construed."7
(2)

Law governing

While federal law controls the time within which one must sue and when a
cause of action arises under the Act, these provisions make it clear that the tort
law of the place where the tort is committed is to control the substantive determination of whether such a cause exists, the nature and extent of recovery permitted

92. Air Transport Associates v. United States, supra note 67.
93.' Senate Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary
on S. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 34 (1940).
94. S. Hearings Before Subcommittee of Committee on the Judiciary on S.
2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 34, 37, 44 (1940); H. Hearings before Committee
on the Judiciaryon H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 31, 32, 33,
61 (1942). See Gilroy v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 664 (D.C. D.C. 1953); Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (D.C. N.J. 1954).
95. Goodwill Industries of El Paso v. United States, 218 F.2d 270 (C.A. Tex.
1954).
96. Lederhouse v. United States, supra note 72.
97. Jones v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 10 (D.C. D.C. 1954); Gilroy v.
United States, supra note 94.
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and the substantive merit of a counterclaim, but not the right to counterclaim,
which is a procedural matter.es
It has been held that where there was a negligent act in Virginia which caused
damage and injury in the District of Columbia, the law of Virginia should control
the measure of liability, over a dissent proclaiming that this was in conflict with
the general conflicts law.' ,
(3)

Theory of liability

The Supreme Court has held that there must be a "negligent" or "wrongful"
act in order to create governmental liability because of the usage of those terms
in Section 1346 (b) of the Act, and that therefore there can be no recovery without
proof of such an act under the doctrine of Rylands V. Fletcher or any other theory
of strict liability.loo If the Federal Tort Claims Act is to be construed with any
liberality at all, this decision is, at best, unimaginative. The purpose of these
provisions being primarily to define generally the liability of the government,
rather than to limit it narrowly, emphasis should be placed upon "if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred" and "in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private person under like circumstances.""'1
Further, Section 1346 (b) is concerned primarily with jurisdiction, while Section 2674 is entitled as and is primarily concerned with a definition of liability. The latter provision makes no
mention of a "negligent" or "wrongful" act and, in case of a substantive difference
in the two provisions, should prevail as to matters of liability. Neither is there
any indication that Congress used the term "wrongful act or omission" in a strict
sense. Moreover, while the activity involved in a strict liability situation is not

98. United States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (C.A. Tex. 1953); Ford v. United
States, 200 F.2d 272 (C.A. Okla. 1953); United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239
(C.A. Colo. 1952) ; Carnes v. United States, 186 F.2d 648 (C.A. N.M. 1951) ; Nolan
v. United States, 186 F.2d 578 (C.A. Va. 1951); Zaccari v. United States, 130 F.
Supp. 50 (D.C. Md. 1955); Eastern Air Lines v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 491
(D.C. Del. 1952), af'd 207 F.2d 560; Foote v. Public Housing Com'r. of United
States, supra note 56.
99. Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied Union Trust Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 911 (1955).
100. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), involving litigation arising
out of the Texas City disaster of 1947. To a charge based upon the inherently
dangerous character of certain nitrates being loaded by the government, the court
said, 346 U.S. at 45: "...
the statute requires a negligent act. So it is our
judgment that liability does not arise by virtue either of United States ownership
of an 'inherently dangerous commodity' or property, or of engaging in an 'extrahazardous' activity . . . the Act does require some brand of misfeasance or nonfeasance, and so could not extend to liability without fault .. ." See Heuser,
Dalehite v. United States, A New Approach to the Federal Tort Claims Act? 7
VAND. L. REv. 175 (1954) ; notes in 66 HARv. L. REV. 488 (1953) ; 45 Ira. L. REV.
791 (1953); 27 IND. L.J. 121 (1951); 52 Micn. L. Rv.733 (1951).
101. Emphasis added.
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technically a wrongful act, in the sense that it is the act which creates liability, it
is wrongful. Such a construction does not seem unreasonable in the light of Congress' expressed intention to create liability for common law torts.
The Court, in a subsequent holding, has denied certiorari in a case where
the government was held liable on a theory of statutory absolute liability.o2 There
seems to be no valid distinction between statutory and common law absolute liability, and this decision may indicate that the Court will not adhere to the former
doctrine in the future.
The greatest difficulty, however, has turned on the phrases "if a private person would be liable" and "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
person under like circumstances." The only clear examples of what was contemplated by Congress are found in automobile accident cases, l o but it seems perfectly
clear that the provisions were not intended to be limited to these. The difficulty
has arisen principally out of situations where the tort was committed in the course
of performing a function peculiar to the government, or where there was a distinctly governmental relationship involved.
In Feres v. United States,o4 military personnel received injuries out of their
service, and it was held that there could be no recovery because of the "distinctively
federal" nature of their relationship to the government, and that the purpose
of the Federal Tort Claims Act was not to create "novel unprecedented liabilities."
It seems clear that, absent the military relationship, liability would be imposed up-

102. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 934 (1954), where plaintiff recovered under a South Carolina statute imposing strict liability for damages caused by an airplane crash upon the owner of the
aircraft. It was attempted to be distinguished from the Dalehite case, Supra note
99, on the basis that the court's decision had directed at possession of dangerous
property rather than at a specific statute imposing strict liability. Much emphasis
was placed upon the language of the F.T.C.A. imposing the liability of a private
individual under like circumstances upon the government. Cf. Parcel v. United
States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1951).
Before the denial of certiorari in the Praylou case, the Dalehite theory was
followed in Strangi v. United States, 211 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954).
See critical comment by Prof. Warren A. Seavey, prior to the denial of certiorari, 67 HARv. L. REv. 994, 996 (1954).
103. H. R. Rep. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3(1940); Hearings before Committee on the Judiciaryoii H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1942).
104. 340 U.S. 135 (1950) affirming Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535
(2d Cir. 1949), involving the death of an Army officer due to negligence in quartering him in unsafe barracks; Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1949), involving a negligent operation by an Army surgeon upon a military
person; and reversing Giggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) involving similar malpractice. Cf. Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954).
See also Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (D.C. Va. 1953), where
the Feres reasoning was followed to deny recovery to injured federal prisoners,
as it was in Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. N.C. 1953).
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on the government.105 In Dalehite v. United States'"8 it was held that the government could not be liable for negligence in firefighting because there was no
analogous liability in private tort law0 7 and because there could be no theory of
governmental liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act arising from "acts of
governmental nature or function."
These decisions have presented four possible theories of liability: (1) that
the United States, like municipal corporations, is liable for torts committed while
performing a "proprietary" function, but not for those committed while performing a "governmental" function;1oa (2) that the government is liable where a
private person would be so liable under exactly the same circumstances, while
performing exactly the same act under local law: (3) that the United States
is liable where a private person would be liable under like or analogous circumstances or for doing the same act, but not where there is no analogous private circumstance or relationship giving rise to liability; and, (4) that the government is liable for all wrongs committed by it except where an exception is specifically made in the Act on the basis of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.180
After nearly a decade of unclear and indecisive action on the part of the Supreme Court, during which it has been justly complained that the Federal Tort
Claims Act has been limited to a motor vehicle accident law by judicial interpretation, no the Court has finally admitted that the Act was intended to constitute a
waiver of governmental tort immunity. The Court, in Indian Towing Company,
Incorporated v. United States,111 seemingly has finally settled this area of law
105. In Brooks v. United States, supra note 21, it was held that servicemen
could recover for injuries received from other military personnel when the relationship did not exist because they were on leave; in Costly v. United States, 181 F.2d
723 (5th Cir. 1950), a non-military patient was allowed recovery for malpractice
suffered at a military hospital; and in Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685
(D.C. W. Va. 1951), a sailor on leave who drowned in government swimming pool
was allowed recovery.
106. Supra note 99. See also Rayonier v. United States, 225 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1955) where recovery was denied for negligent fire fighting on the same basis;
and National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied 347 U.S. 967 (1954), where recovery was denied for injuries arising
from an erroneous flood forecast. But see Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States,
112 F. Supp. 792 (D.C. Mo. 1953).
107. But cf. Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
108. For the difficulties and inconsistencies of this theory, see note 11, supra,
109. Cf. Wojcuik v. United States, supra note 44.
110. See Gellhorn and Lauer, supra note 16, 29 N.Y. U. L. Rav. at 1326.
111. Note 11 supra. The action had been dismissed in the district court as
being cognizable only -under the Suits in Admiralty Act, and this judgment was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1954). Certiorari was granted "because the case presented an important
aspect of the still undetermined extent of the government's liability" under the
F.T.C.A., 348 U.S. 810 (1954). In the first hearing, it was affirmed by an equally
divided court, 349 U.S. 902 (1955). A petition for rehearing was granted, 349
U.S. 926 (1955), and the prior judgment was vacated. Noted in: 1 HOWARD L.J.
128 (1955); 42 A.B.A.J. 68 (1956); 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 167 (1956); 2 HowARD
L.J. 159 (1956); 54 MIcE. L. REv. 875 (1956); 27 Miss. L.J. 252 (1956); 2 N.Y.L.
FoRum 223 (1956); 31 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 306 (1956); 30 St. JOHN's L. REV. 301
(1956)); 9 F.R.D. 143 (1956).
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under the Act and adopted the third theory above. The Indian Towing Company
case held that the government was liable for the negligent operation of a lighthouse
even though a statute made such operation an exclusively governmental act. 12
The court emphasized that liability "as a private individual under like circumstances" does not depend upon the presence or absence of identical private activity
and, recognizing that the Act has specific limits, decided that "all governmental
activity is inescapably 'uniquely governmental' in that it is performed by the government."i1 3 Thus, the Court rejected any theory of liability for torts committed
in the performance of a "proprietary" function only, and made the test of liability
dependent upon whether there was an analogous or "like" liability in private tort
law. The court also rejected the second theory above, stating that Congress did
not intend to "predicate liability upon such a completely fortuitous circumstance . . .the presence or absence of identical private activity."
Voluntarily undertaking to give warning of dangerous conditions, upon which
warnings the public comes to rely, will involve liability against the volunteer in
nearly all American jurisdictions and at common law, where he negligently performs the undertaking.224 Even though only the government may operate a lighthouse, there is no reason why it should not be liable on the same basis under the
language of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Unlike the Feres and Dalehito cases,
here there would be liability on the part of a private individual under "like"
circumstances.115
Thus, the liability of the United States, as with any private individual, is
dependent upon the tort law of the jurisdiction wherein the tort occurred, and
it follows therefore that the usual test as to duty of care and causation are to be
applied to subject the government to liability when a private individual would
be liable under like circumstances.

112. 14 U.S.C. § 83 (1952) prohibits private individuals from operating navigational aids and makes such operation an exclusively governmental function.
113.' Cf. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383-384 (1947).
114. A case indicating the close analogy is Erie Railway Co. v. Stewart, 40
F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), where defendant undertook to warn the public of dangers
at its crossing and then, without notice to the public, withdrew the warning. Held,
defendant was liable to plaintiff for damages thereby sustained Cf. Revilocqua v.
United States, 122 F. Supp. 493 (D.C. Pa. 1954).
115. The Argument of the Feres case has been distinguished or denied, and
the government held liable under the F.T.C.A. for: exploding a nuclear device,
Bullock v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (D.C. Utah 1955) ; negligently guarding
a sunken vessel, Somerset Sea Food Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir.
1951) ; negligently protecting a parking lot, Carri v. United States, supra note 90;
and negligently operating an airport control tower, Air Transport Associates v.
United States, supra note 67, and Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Company, supra
note 99.
Certiorari was denied in the last mentioned case upon the basis of the Indian
Towing Co. case, Union Trust Company v. United States, supra note 99.
See also Eastern Transport Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927), where
the United States was held liable for the performance of a purely "governmental"
function.
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(4)

Special doctrines of negligence

Since the United States is liable in accordance with the substantive private
tort law of the locale where the tort was committed, it has been determined that
a number of state special doctrines involving liability for negligence are applicable
to the government.
It has been held that the common law maxim that one must so sue his property
so as not to injure that of another is applicable to the United States, and sufficient
to raise an inference of failure to use due care so that the burden of going forward
with the evidence is shifted to the government.216 It has also been determined that
the burden of going forward with the evidence may be shifted by local doctrines
of res ipsa loquitur.217 The doctrine of imputed negligence is also applicable to the
government.118
Where the plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to be protected,
and the harm was such as was intended to be prevented, violation of a state
statute may, of itself, be sufficient negligence upon which to predicate the government's liability."9
It has also been held that the liability of the United States may be predicated
upon the doctrine of last clear chance,120 and upon this basis it may be expected
that the humanitarian doctrine and other similar rules of law may be the bases
of federal liability.

116. State Road Department of Fla. v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 489 (D.C.
Fla. 1949), where government vessels dragged anchor and collided with a bridge
during a strong wind.
117. United States v. Johnson, 181 F.2d 57 (C.A. Ga. 1950); D'Anna v.
United States, 181 F.2d 335 (C.A. Md. 1950); Hampton v. United States, 121 F.
Supp. 303 (D.C. Nev. 1950). In Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1955), plaintiff did not sufficiently make out a res ipsa case when he showed that
the defendant had exclusive control the thing causing injury and superior knowledge or means of information, but failed to show that the accident would not have
occurred in the ordinary course of events if the defendant had exercised due care.
Apparently, the three elements usually necessary in res ipsa cases are required:
1. that the defendant be in a better position to show what
happened;
2. that the defendant have exclusive control of the instrumentality; and
3. that the injury would not ordinarily occur in the course
of events but for negligence.
118. Siciliano v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 726 (D.C. N.J. 1949). Cf. United
States v. White, 211 F.2d 79 (C.A. Cal. 1954).
119. Stewart v. United States, 186 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1951), violation of a
statute providing means to be employed in the storage of explosives; Desch v.
United States, 186 F.2d 623 (C.A. Ill. 1951), where a truck was driven in violation
of the maximum width permitted by statute; Combs v. United States, 122 F. Supp.
280 (D.C. N.C. 1954), where statute providing for speed zone through construction
area was violated.
120. Combs v. United States, supranote 119.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/9

30

et al.: Editorial
Board/Comments
MISSOUBI
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 22

It has also been held that the attractive nuisance doctrine may be invoked to
hold the government liable where children were attracted to the nuisance.21I
The government may come into special relationships with claimants which will
impose a duty of care and liability upon it accordingly. Thus, the United States
may become liable as a bailee to exercise the degree of care required of such a
bailee in the state wherein the bailment existed.1122 Recovery, on the other hand,
has been denied for the death of a passenger in a government aircraft on the
W 3
ground that he was a gratuitous passenger.
Also, the government's liability
as a possessor of land, and the duty and degree of care owed by it to persons coming upon the land, is dependent upon the classification of the claimant's relationship to the government at the time of the accident.12,
5. Defenses and Exceptions to Liability
(a) Defenses
Title 28, Section 2674 of the United States Code only waives immunity from
suit in cases based on tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances, and does not deny to the United
States available defenses which a private individual may have under like circum-

121. Meara v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. Ky. 1952). The doctrine
has been applied even where the parents were contributorily negligent, Beasley v.
United States, 81 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. S.C. 1948); but not where there was no
showing of knowledge of the dangerous condition or of negligence on the part of
the government, United States v. Inmon, supra note 98.
122. Davies Flying Service, Inc. v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 776 (D.C. Ky.
1953), aff'd. 216 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1954).
123. Cf. Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied
348 U.S. 953 (1955), involving the death of a West Point Cadet while on leave.
The court also relied upon the doctrine of the Feres case. See also United States
v. Westfall, 197 F.2d 765 (C.A. Wash. 1952), where the passenger in a government
vehicle was not considered as a guest and denied recovery.
124. The cases indicate that the usual classifications of this relationship are
generally adhered to, and the liability imposed accordingly. A "trespasser" or
"licensee" may only recover for injuries when they were sustained by reason of
wanton or willful negligence, or intentionally inflicted, Firfer v. United States,
208 F.2d 524, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 216 (1953), involving a hole in a grass plot;
Lem v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 915 (D.C. D.C. 1950), involving a hole abutting
a concrete gutter. See also Ford v. United States, supra note 98; Denny v. United
States, 185 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1950); Floras v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 640
(D. N.M. 1952). An "invitee" or "business guest" is owed a duty of reasonable
or ordinary care, Gaitskill v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 621 (D.C. Kan. 1955),
involving a snow covered ramp; Brewer v. United States, supra note 72, involving
unsafe conditions about a government swimming pool; Phillips v. United States,
102 F. Supp. 943 (D.C. Tenn. 1952), and Blaine v. United States, 102 F. Supp.
161 (D.C. Tenn. 1952), involving dangerous conditions on government premises.
See also White v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Cal. 1951). It has also
been held that an employee of an independent contractor is owed the degree of
care due ito an invitee, Clarke v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Md. 1958).
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stances.12fl Thus, contributory negligence may constitute a valid defense to an
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 20 except where the government is
charged with wanton or wilful negligence.27, Likewise, if the claimant can be
found to have assumed the risk, his action will thereby be defeated.2s Although
no cases appear to have considered the question, and it is probably decided by the
Federal Employees Compensation Act, it would follow that the fellow servant
doctrine would be applicable. Also a suit may be defended upon the basis that
the injury was caused by an Act of God.29
(b)

Exceptions

(1)

Generally

Title 28, Section 2680 of the United States Code contains a number of specific
exceptions to the liability of the United States in tort. Other than the discretionary exception which is included in the first of these, they have, as a whole, presented
little difficulty to the courts.
Among the more important of these exceptions, which have not already been
discussed, is the bar to claims based on the so-called intentional torts.13o This exception does not preclude recovery against the United States for negligence in
the failure to supervise a ward who commits an assault against the claimant,1 1
since it only applies to assaults made by an employee of the government.It has

125. Kirk v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 233 (D.C. Idaho 1954).
126. United States v. Inmon, supra note 98, prying seal from blasting cap;
Sartori v. United States, 186 F.2d 679 (C.A. Utah 1950), husband suing for death
of wife was precluded from recovery by his own contributory negligence; Watt v.
United States, 123 F. Supp. 906 (D.C. Ark. 1954), where claimant failed to direct
agent in operation of automobile; Timmins v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 22 (D. C.
N.Y. 1954), placing foot on escalator; Gilpin v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 812
(D.C. Wash. 1954), driving in front of oncoming ambulance.
127. Curry v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 38 (D.C. S.C. 1954) defining "wilfulness," within the meaning of the F.T.C.A., as the "conscious absence of due
care," and holding that mere contributory negligence is no defense as against
wilful negligence.
128. Stikowich v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 925 (D.C. Pa. 1952), where
claimant knowingly and willingly rode with a drunken military driver.
129. State Road Department of Fla. v. United States, suira note 116 involving
damage caused by a severe wind.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (1952) specifically precludes recovery in actions
arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference
with contract rights. See generally, Note, 7 VAND. L. REv. 283 (1954).
131. Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (C.A. N.Y. 1954); Rufino v. United
States, supra note 41.
132. Held to be assaults within the meaning of the exclusion were: operating
without the claimant's consent by a government surgeon, Moos v. United States,
225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955) ; the use of excessive force in the making of an arrest
by a government agent, Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909 (C.A. Va. 1953),
cert. denied 347 U.S. 933 (1954), and Lewis v. United States, 194 F.2d 689 (C.A.
N.J. 1952); use of third degree tactics by a government agent, United States v.
Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (C.A. Wash. 1950).
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been held that this exclusion precluded recovery for damages suffered by reason
of inaccurate flood reports because they constituted a misrepresentation.-' Other
important exceptions to liability include false arrest and imprisonment,28' and
interference with contract rights.14
The government cannot be held liable for the act or omission of any employee
committed in the execution of any statute or regulation with due care, whether or
not the statute or regulation is valid.1Actions for the torts of the Tennessee Valley Authority,2z and claims arising
out of the combat activities of the armed forces during time of wari s ' are also
precluded from the scope of liability under the Act; and since the Panama Canal
Company operates out of its own earnings rather than appropriated funds, and is
subject to suit in tort as well as contract as a corporation, Congress excluded it
from the operation of the Federal Tort Claims Act.-'

133. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 106. The exception has
been held to include negligent misrepresentations, Clark v. United States, 218
F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954) ; and wilful misrepresentation and deceit, Jones v. United
States, 207 F.2d 563 (C.A. N.Y. 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 921.
134. For-general application, see Tinkoff v. United States, 211 F.2d 890 (C.A.
I1. 1954); Duenges v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 751 (D.C. N.Y. 1953); Ekberg
v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 99, 110 Ct. Cl. 267 (1948).
135. For general application, see Nicholson v. United States, 177 F.2d 768
(C.A. Ga. 1949); Fletcher v. Veterans Administration, 103 F. Supp. 654 (D. C.
Mich. 1952).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a). Held to have precluded liability within the meaning
of this exemption were: the placing of a foreign business man's name on list of
blocked nationals pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§§ 32-39, Gubbins v. United States, 192 F.2d 411, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 293 (1951);
the -actions of judicial officers in discharge of their duties, Papagianakis v. The
Somas, 186 F.2d 257 (C.A. Va. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 921 (1951); the wrongful reduction of grazing permits pursuant to a regulation of the Secretary of
Agriculture, Smith v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 87 (D.C. Colo., 1951), aff'd. 196
F.2d 222 (1952) ; releasing mental patients in strict accordance with regulations,
Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (W.D. Ala. 1949). See generally,
Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration,5 VAND. L.
REV. 167 (1952).
137. For general application of this exception, see U.S. ex rtel. and for Use of
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Lacy, 116 F. Supp. 15 (D.C. Ala. 1953).
138. "Combatant Activities" within the meaning of this exception have been
variously defined as: both physical violence and activities necessary to, and in
direct connection with, actual hostilities, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949) ; activities which by their very nature should be free from the hindrance
of a possible damage suit, Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767 (C.A. Wash.
1948). See also Trover v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 558 (D.C. Mo. 1947), appeal
dismissed, 170 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1948). However, in the face of the fact that
the wrongful act complained of was that of a Veterans Administration doctor
in his examination of the complainant, it has been held, in an extremely doubtful
decision, that the claim fell within the exclusion because the injury was originally
a combat injury and therefore arose out of combatant activities during time of
war. Perucki v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 959 (D.C. Pa. 1948).
139. See House Report 830 to accompany S. 1168, U.S. CoDE AND CONG. StraV.,
81st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol.2, p. 1589; Gardner v. Panama Railway Co., 342 U.S.
29 (1951).
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The discretionary exception

Undoubtedly the most important exception contained in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, and at the same time, the most confusing and baffling exception in
its application, has been the discretionary exclusion740 Generally, what Congress
had in mind was to prevent the use of the Federal Tort Claims Act to test the
"propriety of a discretionary administrative act,"1', and to prevent its application
to plans and programs formulated by high executives from being subjected to suit
when they go amiss. However, Congress neglected to define a "discretionary function" and left little record of what it was intended to include, other than that the
2
decisions of regulatory agencies were discretionary functions.1' Consequently,
the problem of finding a workable test for determining what is and what is not a
discretionary function has been left largely to the courts. Seemingly, this problem
has proven too much for them, for as yet they have utterly failed to produce a
comprehensive and fair definition thereof by the judicial process, and the decisions,
as a result, stand in a state of irreconcilable confusion.'"3

140. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1952), provided: "The provisions of this chapter . . .
shall not apply to-(a) Any claim .. .based upon the exercise or performance
whether
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty .
or not the discretion involved be abused."
141. Hearingsbefore Committee on the Judiciaryon H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1942).
142. See H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
148. A large number of cases have applied the exclusion to preclude the
government's liability. Instances where liability has been precluded on this
basis are: supervision of migratory workers at a reception center established under federal statute where claimant's property was stolen, Goodwill Industries of
El Paso v. United States, supra note 95; inaccurate weather reporting, National
Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 106; releasing dangerous mental patients,
Smart v. United States, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953), and Kendrick v. United
States, supra note 136; corporate losses due to Securities Exchange Commission
investigation, Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1952); Changing
flow of a river and creating a new waterway, thereby damaging claimant's land,
Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Temporary suspension of
regulation banning shipments of explosives through port, Pennsylvania Railway
Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (D. N.J. 1954); dredging operations to permit berthing of aircraft carriers after launching, F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.
v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. N.Y. 1954) ; inaccurate prediction of flood
conditions on river, Western Mercantile Co. v. United States. 111 F. Supp. 799
(W.D. Mo. 1953); Spraying herbicide, Harris v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 298
(E.D. Oda. 1952); aff'd. 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); Decision to remove dead
snag, Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (D. P.R. 1951); Decision of how
much water to let over a dam, Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D. N.D.
1951). One decision which illustrates the danger of the ad hoc means of adjudication employed is Dahlstorm v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 772 (D. Minn. 1955),
which employed the exception to prevent liability for flying at 100 feet over
claimant's farm, frightening livestock, pursuant to orders to survey. By this
decision, it would be a discretionary function to determine whether to drive on the
left or right hand side of a busy highway. See notes in 22 GEo. WASH. L. RB-. 496
(1954); 23 GEo. WASH. L. Ruv. 716 (1955).
A large number of cases have also denied the applicability of this exclusion
and determined the liability upon local law. Among them are: abandoning a
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This confusion led the Supreme Court to a decision in the once leading
Dalehito case,1 ", the inferences of which could completely destroy all governmental
liability based on the Federal Tort Claims Act. There, when the government
failed to warn subsequent handlers of ammonium nitrate of its dangerous characteristics known to the government, it was held that the United States was not liable
because the choice of whether to act or not to act involved discretion. Since every
wrongful act of misfeasance or nonfeasance involves not only the discretionary
choice of whether to act or not, but also the choice of how to act, if this startling
test for the application of the exclusion were to be adhered to, the effectiveness of
the Act would be at its obvious end. It seems noteworthy that Congress indirectly
expressed its disapproval of the Dalehite decision shortly after its final disposition
by assuming compassionate responsibility for the losses involved.";
In the subsequent Indian Towing case,140 the court indicated that some limitation would be observed in applying the exception, but persisted in failing to explain what the limitation would be. There, although they had previously affirmed
the court of appeals decision to the contrary, both the majority and minority held,
without, explanation, that failure to inspect a light-house fell without the exclusion of liability. This decision may probably be regarded as substantially overruling the radical language, if not the holding, in the Dalehite case. 1 ",
Perhaps the most intelligible suggestions on this problem have come from
legal writers. It has been suggested that the duty to act is inconsistent with the
choice of whether to act or not, and that once that duty is found, the discretionary
exemption disappears." ' It has also been suggested that a distinction may be made
between a primary executive decision as to the undertaking of a course of action,
and the subsequent minor decisions involved in the execution of the undertaking,
and that Congress only intended that the former decision should be protected by

Coast Guard Tower which was used by children to play where the government
should have known of the danger, McGill v. United States, 200 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.
1952); improperly marking a sunken vessel, Somerset Sea Food Co. v. United
States, supra note 115; failure to set warning signals during road construction,
Hernandez v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 369 (D. Hawaii 1953).
See generally, notes in: 52 MIcH. L. REv. 733 (1954); 23 U. CIN. L. REV. 125
(1954); 32 N.C. L. REV. 118 (1953); 3 BUFFALo L. Rnv. 163 (1953); 39 COaN. L.
Q. 134 (1953); 101 U. PA. L. Rnv. 420 (1952); 45 ILL L. REV. 791 (1951) (chronological order).
144. Supra note 99. It might be noted that an aggregate of over $2,000,000
worth of claims depended upon the outcome of this case, and the court may have
been somewhat motivated by this fact.
145. Pub. L. No. 378, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (Aug. 12, 1955).
146. Supra notes 11, 111.
147. This is borne out by the court's treatment of United States v. Union Trust
Co, supra note 99, shortly after the decision in the Indian Towing case, when it
was held that the discretionary exclusion would not prevent the government from
being held liable for the negligence operation of an airport control tower resulting
in a collision of airplanes.
148. See Note, 25 FORDHAm L. REv. 167, 170 (1956).
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the application of the discretionary exception.49 Another writer has presented
the proposition that the confusion and inconsistency in the cases can only be
eliminated by looking to the factors which influence the decisions, maintaining
that "discretionary function" defies formal definition.15o
6. Damages and Judgment
(a)

Damages-2l

While there is no limit placed upon the amount of damages which one may
recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a claimant may recover only compensatory damages which are actually directly suffered by him.1" There may,
under Section 2674 of the Act, be no recovery for punitive damages,153 although
Congress provided one exception to this when it was discovered that the wrongful
death statutes of two states were interpreted to be of a punitive nature.2
In
these states, the United States may be liable for punitive damages measured by
the claimant's actual pecuniary injuries.
Damages are to be reduced by any amount which the claimant has received
as compensation therefor under any other remedy from the United States."55
It has been held that a maximum limit under a state wrongful death statute
may be applied to limit the liability of the United States.25
A reviewing court has the power and duty to review findings as to damages
and to modify them if they are clearly "erroneous" as in any case tried without a

jury.2"

149. See Comment, 36 MARQ. L. REv. 88, 91 (1952).
This solution has been
criticized as merely rephrasing the problem into a question of what is the distinction between a decision to act and a decision of execution. 66 HARM. L. REV. 448
(1953).
150. See Comment, 66 HARv. L. REV.488 (1952), indicating that the following
factors are important:
(a) the language of the statute under which the official acts;
(b) the type of discretion involved;
(c) the position which the government employee occupies;
(d) the repercussions of the activity;
(e) the discretionary function as it is defined in other contexts;
(f) the presence of a "governmental function."
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952).
152. Heath v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 196 (D.C. Ala. 1949). These may, of
course, include damages which will be suffered in the future, Stuuk v. United
States, 129 F. Supp. 530 (D.C. N.H. 1954).
153. Littleton v. Vitro Corp. of America, 130 F. Supp. 774 (D.C. Ala. 1955);
Wilscom v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 581 (D.C. Hawaii 1948).
154. House Report No. 748, June 30, 1947, U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 1548, 80th
Cong. (1947).
155. United States v. Brown, supra note 41.
156. United States v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co., 227 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1955).
157. United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d 266 (4th Cir 1954).
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Judgment

It has been held that the Federal Tort Claims Act, by waiving the governments tort immunity, thereby authorizes the hearing of an action for a declaratory
judgment involving the liability of the government under the Act.-8
A final judgment against the United States allowing one of several possible
remedies constitutes an election of remedies and prohibits any further action
against!either the government, or the negligent employee.1 51
III. CONCLUSIONS
After years of legislative struggle, the Federal Tort Claims Act was finally
enacted to answer the definite social need which had demanded its birth. Since it
was first enacted in 1946, the construction of the Act has undergone enormous
liberalization. This liberalization has been attributable in part to the variety of
situations which have been presented to the courts in its decade-long history, and
in part to the gradual realization by judicial personnel that the ancient principles
of sovereign immunity are no longer applicable. The limitations which had been
placed upon it by the Dalehite case and its predecessors have been erased by the
most significant Indian Towing Company case. A theory of liability is becoming
crystallized which follows the liberal principles that Congress intended to breathe
into the Act, and the much abused exemption for discretionary functions at last
promises to be limited.
The history of the Act indicates that a more liberal application of it may be
expected in the future, so that it will fill the gap in the American juristic system
which inspired its creation.
RAYMOND R. RoBEa

158. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 80 (D. N.J.
1953).
159. Moon v. Price, 213 F.2d 794 (C.A. Ga. 1954) ; Satterwhite v. Bocotato, 180
F. Supp. 825 (D.C. N.C. 1955).
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STATUTORY IMMUINITY AND ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY

The United States Constitutional provision of the Fifth Amendment, "nor
shall (any person) be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . .,"has been presented in an ever increasing number of important

and serious matters. These cases include considerations of the validity of immunity statutes, and their relation to the self-incrimination clause. 2 This problem
is not a new one, one of the first and most important cases upholding such an act
being decided in 1896.a The most recent development is the case of Ullmann
v. United States. 4 This decision is not unique in causing controversy, as the self-

1. If one were to question this, or the reason therefor, it might best be
answered by a quotation from the words of Dean Griswold, in his book, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY (Harvard News Service, 1955) when, at pp. 8-9, he said:
"Where matters of a man's belief or opinions or political views are essential elements in the charge, it may be most difficult to get evidence from sources other
than the suspect or accused himself. Hence, the significance of the privilege
over the years has perhaps been greatest in connection with resistance to prosecution for such offences as heresy or political crimes. In these areas the privilege
against self-incrimination has been a protection for freedom of thought and a
hindrance to any government which might wish to prosecute for thoughts and
opinion alone."
2. The immunity statute presently to be considered is the Immunity Act
of 1954, 68 STAT. 745, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. II) 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486. Section
(c), the pertinent section, reads as follows: "Whenever in the judgment of a
United States attorney the testimony of any witness, or the production of books,
papers, or other evidence by a witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand
jury or court of the United States involving any interference with or endangering
of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger, the national security
or defense of the United States . . .is necessary to the public interest, he, upon
the approval of the Attorney General, shall make application to the Court that
the witness shall be instructed to testify or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused
from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground
that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or
subject him to any penalty or forfeiture. But no such witness shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence; nor shall testimony
so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except prosecution
described in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any court." (emphasis added)
3. One of the first such statutes upheld was in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896). That statute, the Act of February 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 STAT. 443, reads
in part: " .. no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing books .. . and documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, on the ground or for the reason
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may
tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission or in obedience to
its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or proceeding."
4. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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incrimination clause has been an important issue in many controversial decisions.
In the past decade that has become increasingly true, and indications are that
this development will continue. Thus, a review of this specific problem relating
to the immunity statute would seem to be in order.
A short rdsum6 of the facts of the principal case will present the problem
so that its important effect might better be understood and appreciated. In
accordance with the provisions of the Immunity Act of 1954, the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed an application for an
order requiring Ullmann to testify before a grand jury. Ullmann had appeared
before the grand jury, pursuant to subpoena, concerning an investigation of
matters relating to "attempts to endanger the national security by espionage
and conspiracy to commit espionage."' In answer to questions of his knowledge
of such activities and of Communist Party membership, Ullmann invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination. Proceedings were taken under the Immunity Act of 1954 to require him to answer. The defense offered attacked the
constitutionality of the act. The district court sustained the constitutionality of the
act, O and ordered Ullmann to testify under the authority of the Immunity Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal from the district court order. Ullmann reiterated his refusal to answer questions before the
grand jury, and he was then charged and convicted of contempt in the district
court. Relying on Brown v. Walker for their opinion, the district court said that
it was not their place to overrule authority that "remains unimpaired and its
principle . . . firmly imbedded in our Constitutional Law.", Before the district
court, one of the alleged grounds of constitutionality of the statute was that it
afforded no protection against state prosecution based on the forced evidence thus
discovered, the reasoning being that since that factor was present, the immunity
was an inadequate substitute for the constitutionally guaranteed protection of
the Fifth Amendment. In answering this contention, the court relied on United
States v. Murdock.8 It was there quite properly stated that the privilege against
self-incrimination cannot be invoked before a federal tribunal where the incrimination would exist under state law. Thus the conclusion was drawn by the court
that the immunity need be only as broad as the privilege, and thus there was no
need to protect the witness against state prosecution. The remainder of the district court opinion dealt with matters that will later be more fully discussed.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit again affirmed the district
court.9' In affirming, the court said that regardless of any merit the arguments
advanced might have, its opinion on the matter was insignificant. The court felt
that it could not modify a supreme court doctrine without some trends in that

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 499.
128 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Id. at 621.
284 U.S. 141 (1931).
221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955).
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direction from the opinions of the court on which to rely. Apparently they found
no such trends. It is interesting to note, however, that when the case was last
before the court of appeals both concurring opinions expressed doubt as to the
validity of the act being reviewed, the opinions, however, resting on different
grounds.1o
The case was then brought to the Supreme Court because of the importance
of the question to be decided, and the decision below, upholding the constitutionality of the act in question, was affirmed. It is the opinion of the Supreme Court
that will receive primary consideration in reviewing this problem.
The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, raised what it considered to be four major issues in making its decision.
They were: 12 (1) "Is the immunity provided by the Act sufficiently broad to displace the protection afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination?" (2)
Assuming arguendo a positive answer to the first question, "Does the Act give the
district judge discretion to deny an application for an order requiring a witness
to answer relevant questions put by the grand jury, and if so, is the court thereby
required to exercise a function that is not an exercise of 'judicial power'?" (3)
"Did Congress provide immunity from state prosecution for crime, and if so, is it
empowered to do so?" (4) "Does the Fifth Amendment prohibit compulsion of
what would otherwise be self-incriminating testimony no matter what the scope
of the immunity statute?"
In any approach to the problem, there are certain considerations as applied to
the privilege against self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment that
should be remembered. This provision, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said,
is to be given a liberal interpretation.-z And as was stated in the case of Maffie V.
United States, if the privilege is thought to be undesirable or outmoded, then the
thing to do is to take it out of the Constitution by proper processes, and not by
"whittling it down by the subtle encroachments of judicial opinion.""8
As to the breadth of the act, and whether it can properly replace the privilege
against self-incrimination afforded by the Constitution, much controversy exists.
The Court in the Ullmann case relied heavily throughout its opinion on the deci-

10. Id. at 763.
11. See note 4, supra at p. 500.
12. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955) ; Emspak v. United States,
349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See also 21 Mo. L. Rxv. 66 (1956).
13. 209 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1954). A similar opinion was expressed by Senator Albert J. Beveridge in an address before the American Bar Association, appearing in 45 REPORTS Or AMERICAN BAR Ass'N 188 at 216 (1920), when he said:

"If liberty is worth keeping and free representative government worth saving, we
must stand for all American fundamentals--not some, but all . . . We cannot
hold fast to some only, and abandon others that, for the moment, we find inconvenient . . ."
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sion of Brown v. Walker, " decided in 1896 on a similar act.1" That act related to
the commerce field, while the act under discussion involves "any interference
with or endangering of... the national security or defense of the United
States . . ."' The court intimated that the ultimate purpose of the privilege
against self-incrimination is achieved by the act in question-that one is no
longer subject to criminal prosecution on the basis of any testimony he might be
required to give. The court went on to reason that when the object of the constitutional question is satisfied, then that is all that is required. Such an argument as this, of course, presupposes the ultimate issue of whether the immunity
granted does in fact provide the same protection guaranteed in our Constitution.
The act in question, as a reminder, states that upon certain facts being found by
the United States attorney, approved by the Attorney General, the court may
order a witness to testify notwithstanding the possibility of self-incrimination.
But in such case, the act provides that "no such witness shall be prosecuted or
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter,
or thing concerning which he is compelled . . . to testify or produce evidence"
and such evidence shall not be used in "any criminal proceeding . . .in any
court."l7 It may thus be seen that any argument based on the objects and purposes of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, as advanced by
the court here, necessarily rests on a finding by the court that the objects of the
Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination-whatever they may be-are satisfied. The question of what the objects of the constitutional provision
might be is not dealt with extensively by the courts in any of the cases decided
after Brown v. Walker, but instead that case is merely cited as authority for the
proposition that when the statute precludes a conviction based on the evidence
a witness is forced to provide, then that is all that is required. This feeling that
a prohibition against prosecution is a sufficient protection probably stemmed originally from certain language in the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock,18 decided in
regard to the first immunity statute. The court there found the Immunity Act
unconstitutional. The provisions of the act provide that forced evidence could
not be used in a subsequent prosecution, but gave no protection against a subsequent prosecution based on related evidence, or on evidence discovered as a result

14. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
15. Act of February 11, 1893, 27 STAT. 443. See note 3 supra. The wording
of this act makes it "the duty of the several district attorneys . . .whenever the
attorney general shall direct . . .to institute . . . proceedings." The only notable difference, then, may be seen that in the 1954 Act presently under discussion,
the United States Attorneys are given more authority in instigating proceedings
of this nature. There would not seem to be any notable difference in the authority
given the courts, as in the Act of 1893 it is said that "the . . . court shall have
the power to compel . .. attendance . . ." similar to the power given the court
in the 1954 Act. (See note 2 supra.)
16. Immunity Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 745.
17. Ibid.
18.! 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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of the forced testimony. The opinion included language to the effect that a
legislative act that afforded absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offense to which the evidence related would be valid. This language was
the basis for the subsequent enactment of the immunity act upheld in Brown v.
Walker. The court, in deciding Brown v. Walker, relied on the language in Counselman v. Hitchcock to decide that a statute that did afford absolute immunity
would be sufficient to compel a witness to testify in spite of the privilege afforded
him by the Fifth Amendment.
The courts, in upholding a substitute for the privilege against self-incrimination such as is provided by the immunity acts, have relied on what they considered
analogous situations to sustain the holding. Thus, under situations where the
Statute of Limitations protects the person under questioning, or where a pardon
for a particular crime has been granted, or where a witness voluntarily testifies,
the Fifth Amendment protection is said no longer to apply.19 The argument is
that there is no reason for its application, as no criminal prosecution could come
of the questioning and the answers. It is comparable to the reasoning that when
the reason for the rule is non-existent then the rule itself disappears.
It is argued that the effect of the immunity is to remove criminality from the
act, and that is all the constitutional privilege provides. It is contended that the
object of the constitutional provision is to secure the witness from criminal prosecution, and a statute absolutely securing to him that immunity from prosecution
would satisfy any demands. The mere possibility that evidence might tend to
disgrace one, or bring him into disrepute does not justify the use of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The argument continues that the
immunity provided need go no farther.
The issue of the scope of the protection of the self-incrimination clause is
one of the phases most strongly urged by the advocates of unconstitutionality.
They contend that there is no protection against state prosecution resulting from
the evidence thus obtained in the proceedings in the federal courts. They grant
that the fear of state prosecution alone would be insufficient on which to base
a reliance on the Fifth Amendment protection. Nevertheless, evidence thus obtained may be used in obtaining leads for other evidence not otherwise obtainable

19. 8 WIGMORE ON EvDENCE § 2280a (3d Ed. 1940): "An Executive pardon
for a past offense protects completely against any prosecution before the Judiciary.
This has never been questioned." In support of this statement, see Queen v.
Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311 (1861). As to the Statute of Limitations, that apparently
is equally clear. Mahanke v. Cleland, 76 Ia. 401, 41 N.W. 53 (1888); Weldon v.
Burch, 12 Ill. 374 (1850); Simpson v. Brooks, 189 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1945); In re
Pilo and In re Christy, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A.2d 176 (1952). That a voluntary waiver
of the privilege may avoid any controversy relating to its application seems almost
unnecessary of much discussion.
But see United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942); 8 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2276 (3d Ed. 1940).
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that might lead to a conviction in the state courts. They contend that if the witness were permitted to remain silent, as he could when relying on the self-incrimination clause without the immunity act, this possibility of state conviction based
on the evidence he provides would not exist. Thus, the conclusion is that the scope
of the act is not equal to the protection provided by the constitutional privilege.The minority opinion in the Ullmann case further made issue of the fact
that the constitutional privilege gives a person the right to remain absolutely
silent and has put the matter beyond legislative control. Thus, it was contended,
any legislative act that gives less protection than absolute silence would provide
is incomplete, and thus invalid.
The minority opinion further contended that there is no protection, under
the act, against disabilities enforced by federal and state governments, and from
the public generally. The real possibility of loss of job, expulsion from labor
unions, and general public opprobrium, is sufficient to indicate that the scope of
the act does not provide the same protection provided under the Fifth Amendment and is thus reason for the unconstitutionality-that there is no true immunity.21 By this argument is raised a far reaching issue that deserves attention,
though probably no answer can be definitely arrived at-that being the purposes
and extent of the protection the Fifth Amendment provides. This is indicated in
the strong dissent written by Mr. Justice Douglas, when he quoted. with approval
a statement from United States v. James:.2 ". .. the privilege of silence against
a criminal accusation, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, was meant to extend
to all the consequences of disclosure." And, as he went on to say, "the critical
point is that the Constitution places the right of silence beyond the reach of government."23 Authority may be found to support either contention as to the scope
and pu-poses of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2, The

20.' The application of this problem in regard to subsequent prosecutions in
state courts will be more thoroughly discussed later. See p. 83.
21. An example of the reaction that these circumstances create is illustrated
very vividly in State v. Sheiner, 6 Fla. Supp. 127 (1954).
22. ! 60 Fed. 257 (D.C.N.D. III. 1894).
23. 76 Sup. Ct. 497 at p. 515 (1956).
24.! Those favoring the statute may look to the language of Mr. Justice Brown
in the opinion of the court in Brown v. Walker, when he said: "The clause of the
Constitution in question is obviously susceptible of two interpretations. If it be
construed literally, as authorizing the witness to refuse to disclose any fact
which might tend to incriminate, disgrace or expose him to unfavorable comments,
then as he must necessarily to a large extent determine upon his own conscience
any responsibility whether his answer to the proposed question will have that
tendency . .. the practical result would be, that no one could be compelled to
testify to a material fact in a criminal case, unless he chose to do so, or unless it
was entirely clear that the privilege was not set up in good faith. If, upon the
other hand, the object of the provision be to secure the witness against a criminal
prosecution, if no such prosecution be possible-in other words, if his testimony
operate a complete pardon for the offense tc which it relates--a statute absolutely
securing to him such immunity from prosecution would satisfy the demands
of the clause in question."
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debate has raged for decades--whether it is only a criminal prosecution that is
protected by the Fifth Amendment, or whether something additional, such as
public opprobrium, or infamy, is to be considered as included within the Fifth
Amendment privilege. An examination of note 24, szpra will reveal further quotations and citations of authorities on this problem for the interested reader.
Argument against constitutionality is further advanced that the privilege
against self-incrimination permits absolute silence on evidence of a nature that
might tend to incriminate. On the other hand, the immunity provided in the
act requires that the evidence of the crime be furnished, with the granting
of immunity a defense in any subsequent prosecution for the crime so "confessed."
This, as was pointed out in the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, is different, as the
person becomes subject to the prosecution, being forced to rely on a defense that
he might not be able to prove.
Advocates of the constitutionality of the act answer this by merely saying
that the argument is not valid, the difference being insignificant, and the dangers
involved improbable. They argue that the witness' position is no different from
that of any other person in being subjected to defending against an unjust charge
of which he is innocent. In such case, he is merely forced to present his available
defense to avoid a conviction. It is contended that the defense given him by the
immunity act makes him no more subject to conviction than if he were innocent
of the charge.
In answer to this allegation, it is emphasized that there is a significant difference between the two situations, as the innocent person was not placed in that
position by the use of his own forced evidence. Also, to prove the immunity suffi-

Those viewing the constitutional interpretation differently may rely equally
well upon the very forceful language of Mr. Justice Grosseup, when in his opinion
in United States v. James, 60 Fed. 257 at p. 264 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), he wrote:
"Did they originate such privilege simply to safeguard themselves against the
law-inflicted penalties and forfeitures? Did they take no thought of the pains
of practical outlawry? The stated penalties and forfeitures of the law might be
set aside; but was there no pain in disfavor and odium among neighbors, in excommunication from church or societies that might be governed by the prevailing
views, in the private liabilities that the law might authorize, or in the unfathomable disgrace, not susceptible of formulation in language, which a known violation
of law brings upon the offender? Then, too, if the immunity was only against the
law-inflicted pains and penalties, the government could probe the secrets of every
conversation or society, by extending compulsory pardon to one of its participants,
and thus turn him into an involuntary informer. Did the framers contemplate
that this privilege of silence was exchangeable always, at the will of the government, for a remission of the participant's own penalties, upon a condition of disclosure, that would bring those to whom he had plighted his faith and loyalty within the grasp of the prosecution? I cannot think so."
However valid either argument may be, and we are not here to determine that,
the decided cases seem to strongly adopt the former view as expounded in the
majority opinion of Brown v. Walker. A collection of the cases may be found in 8
WIGMORE oN EvmExcE § 2255 (3d Ed. 1940).
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ciently for acquittal there must be competent evidence to support the contention.
It is thus argued that there is the possibility of the defendant being unable to
prove his defense, and that in any such case of doubt as to the protection that is
provided, the act should be declared unconstitutional as inconsistent with the Fifth
Amendment. Further discussion on this point may be found upon examination
of the minority opinion in the Ullmann case.,r
In regard to the matter of presenting a defense in the event of a subsequent
prosecution, the protection given by the immunity act is to any proceeding relating
to the evidence offered. What is within that protection of any proceeding has to
be determined, of necessity, at a later time by a different court. Other matters
that would likewise have to be later determined would be such things as whether
the United States attorney properly brought the proceedings under the act, with
the approval of the Attorney General, in a case where the witness has invoked
the Fifth Amendment. Who can say positively that the intended protection will
in fact be provided? This would clearly show the defect of the immunity statute,
in providing less than it takes away.
That both sides to this controversy can obtain competent and convincing authority !on which to base their contentions as to the proper interpretation and application of the Fifth Amendment is unquestioned. The only issue thus presented
seemed to be which of the opposing contentions the Supreme Court would adopt.
It would appear that this has been decided in favor of proponents of the act.
All of the acts presented since Brown v. Walker was decided in 1896 that contain
language substantially the same as that of the present act under discussion have
been upheld. This is true on both the federal and state level.
As for the second issue raised concerning the giving of discretion to the district judge in the form of a non-judicial power, less attention has been directed.
The court avoided any determination of whether the act would be invalid if it gave
the district judge discretion by its holding that a fair reading of Article (c) of the
Immunity Act does not give discretion to the district judge. The pertinent part
of Article (c) reads: "Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney
the testimony of any witness .. . in any case or proceeding .. .Involving any
interference with . .. the national security or defense of the United States .. .
is necessary, he upon approval of the Attorney General, shall make application to
the court that the witness shall be instructedto testify or produce evidence subject
to the provision of this section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not
be excused from testifying . . .on the ground that the testimony . .. may tend to
incriminate him . . ."
(emphasis added) The issue is thus resolved by a matter
of interpretation. The court pointed out that their interpretation of the clause in
question was that the only duty of the district judge is to determine whether the

25.1 See p. 509-510 of 76 Sup. Ct. 497 (1956).
26. Immunity Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 745.
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statutory requirements had been complied with.

If he so finds, then the court

shall instruct the witness to answer the pertinent questions directed to him. This
conclusion would seem to do away with any necessity to deal at any length with the
issue. Perhaps it might fairly be assumed that if the act did in fact give to the
judge discretion, and thus a non-judicial function, then the act might be found
invalid. But, such a holding was here avoided. The court was guided by its well
recognized principle that when the constitutionality of a legislative act is raised,
the court will first ascertain "whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."?
On the issue of whether state prosecution has been precluded by this act, and if
so, whether Congress has the power to preclude state prosecution, varying problems are presented. Also presented are collateral issues that will be dealt with in
this discussion.
Before discussing this matter, it is interesting to note that as to state prosecution the legislators themselves apparently were not convinced of their power.
The Committee Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives reveals that, when it was said:

"Even though the power of Congress to

prohibit a subsequent state prosecution is doubtful, such a constitutional question
should not prevent the enactment of the recommended bill . . . The language . . .
is sufficiently broad to ban a subsequent state prosecution if it be determined
that Congress has the constitutional power to do so . . .,,S
In determining whether there was coverage as to state prosecution, an examination of whether there was an intent to include state prosecution within the scope
of the act was made. The court, in finding that it was so intended, relied upon
. .
.
legislative discussions to base its finding. In so doing, the court quoted:
The language . . . is sufficiently broad to ban a subsequent state prosecution if
it be determined that the Congress has the constitutional power to do so . . . the
committee believes that the fullest protection that can be afforded the witness will
be achieved." 9 A review of the wording of the act would not seem to cause serious
conflict that Congress intended the act to be worded as broadly as possible. The
act provided that the immunity was to extend to "any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing . . . in any such case or proceeding."' o Again, the court relied upon Brown v. Walker to justify its conclusion.
Quoting that opinion: "The immunity is intended to be general, to be applicable
whenever and in whatever court such prosecution may be had."al

It might be

27. United States v. Rumiley, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Aswander v. T.V.A., 297
U.S. 288 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
28. H.R. REP. No. 2606, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).
29. From the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, id.
30. Immunity Act of 1954; See note 2 stpra.
31. The quotation appeared at p. 608, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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noted that the language of the present act was quite similar to the act involved
in Brown v. Walker. As the court decided in Adams v. State of Maryland,8I the
congressional intent is clear from the language. It might be remembered, however, that the Adams case went only so far as to say that the forced evidence
could not be used in the state courts, taking no position apparently against the use
of discovered evidence in those courts. The court in the Adams case reached
the conclusion it did by saying that there could be only one purpose in Congress including the words "any court or proceeding" to extend the coverage of the act
to its fullest extent. Such an interpretation was there said to be in accord with
popular understanding-that it applied to state courts as well.
Those arguing to the contrary as to congressional intent make mention of
the fact that, if they had so intended, Congress could have been more specific in
applying the act to state courts. The contention is that the failure to so do should
be interpreted as a lack of intent that it so apply. This lack of intent, in turn,
should govern the courts in their interpretation of the statute.
However, primary reliance is made on the contention that even if congressional
intent is to be found, there was still lacking the power to so apply the act.
Proponents of the act advance a very ingenious argument in support of their
position. They contend that this is an area within which Congress is authorized
to legislate, as it relates to the national defense and security.2" Proceeding from
this basic premise, they argue that under the "necessary and proper" clause,8"
Congress is authorized to enact such legislation as it may deem necessary and
proper in furthering their granted powers, it here being the general defense and
national security that is involved. They contend that Congress has felt it necessary for proper legislative purposes to be fulfilled within this field, that immunity
be granted as to criminal prosecution in certain cases so that investigations will
not be impeded. The court did not feel that it could overthrow this claim that
Congress had indicated as to the necessity of the testimony, and that therefore,
the legislation is authorized under the Constitution. They then contend, that In
making an application of the immunity binding on the state courts, the Supreme
Law of the Land provision of the Constitution- could properly be invoked.

32. 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
33. This contention, of course, is based on U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, para. 1,
reading in part: "The Congress shall have power . . .to . . .provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States . ...
34. This authorization would be found in U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, para. 18,
reading: "(The Congress shall have Power) . . . . To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution . .. "
35. This contention rests upon U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2 reading: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding."
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The argument of congressional authority, and its application to the states,
suggested above, was first advanced in Brown v. Walker. In nearly every decision
on the matter since that case, it has been reiterated.
In Jack v. Kansas,"6 the court said that while a state immunity statute could
not prevent a prosecution of the same party under a United States statute, that
was no objection to its validity. In its opinion, the court referred to Brown v.
Walker in its approval of the language to the effect that a bare possibility of prosecution by another sovereignty was not a real and probable danger, and need not
be taken into account. The court then felt justified in finding the immunity
statute constitutional.
The problem of self-incriminatory evidence received under a state immunity
statute being used in federal courts was presented in Feldman v. United States."The Court there said that the Fifth Amendment had no application to prevent
the use of such evidence.
But, in 1954, under a slightly different version of the act presently under
consideration, the Court held that the immunity act barred the use in a state
prosecution of testimony previously. compelled under the act in question.- However,
it was also stated that the act did not bar prosecution based on evidence discovered because of the forced disclosure. In that respect the Ullmann case, in
its ultimate effect, would extend that situation as well, prohibiting any state
prosecution of related crimes. The Adams case clearly presented the problem
of state prosecution based on the forced evidence under the immunity statutes.
In United States v. Murdock,30 it was said that immunity against state prosecution was not essential to the validity of the act. They there stated that this
rule applied equally to state statutes in regard to federal prosecution. The court
went on to state that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the govenment compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished
by the rule against self incrimination. One may find this idea repeatedly suggested in the cases sustaining the validity of immunity statutes.
Again, in Hale v. Henkelto it was stated that the Fifth Amendment gave protection only against prosecution and not protection against damages to the reputation. The court, referring to the possibility of state prosecution, stated that it
was of no importance that no protection was afforded against prosecution in
state courts. In making this statement, we find another often repeated statement
made use of. The court also stated that the same rule applied in the reverse situation where the state statute was in question. It may thus be observed that often

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

199 U.S. 372 (1905).
322 U.S. 487 (1944).
Adams v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
284 U.S. 141 (1930).
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the Immunity Act with a holding
that application to other sovereignties was unnecessary.
A forceful argument supported by a long line of authority may be presented
in a case to support the constitutionality of such an act. Even though to change
the apparently existing rule a reversal of the cases reviewed would have to be
made, there is still a vigorous attack made upon the constitutionality of the acts
by members of the bar and others. Perhaps then, the cases thus far presented
are not alone the final and conclusive answer to the problem.
As mentioned before, the Court has repeatedly advanced the argument in its
decisions that even if the act does not apply to the states, it is not necessary that
it do so. They contend that (1) the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination does not dictate such an application, and (2) that prosecution by the state
is an imaginary possibility based on exaggeration of words, and of no weight.
We have earlier seen an application of these arguments in the cases reviewed.
On the other side of the picture, there are arguments that the federal government by its legislation cannot control prosecution by the states-that they are
completely without power to do this. It is argued that Congress cannot create
state courts, it cannot establish rules of law to govern those courts, and that it
cannot prescribe penalties to be imposed in those courts. Likewise, by analogy,
it cannot prescribe rules of proceeding, as is here being attempted.
In regard to the argument that the prosecution by the states is imaginary,
it is pointed out by opponents of the act that there are cases where that very thing
happens. It might be noted that the Adams case, relied upon by the majority
opinion on the immunity act's application to state courts, is just such a case.
It seems likely that such a practice would become quite common, rather than being
imaginary, or improbable. The decisions and opinions on this matter, when
prosecution by the state is attempted, is that the prosecution is not playing fair,
or that they should not do that, but the courts then decided that there is nothing
that can be done to prevent it.41 Thus, the contention is that the fear is a very
real one.
Also advanced is a related argument, in that the act creates the very real
possibility of collusion between federal and state authorities-that the federal
government will provide immunity against prosecution and then the states, with
the evidence thus procured, will commence prosecution. Such an argument presumes the inapplicability of the act to the states. To an argument that such practices would not occur, perhaps reference should be made to cases arising from
the enforcement of prohibition. When the issue was there the constitutional pro-

41. See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905): "We do not believe that in
such case there is any real danger of a f~deral prosecution, or that such evidence
would be availed of by the government for such purposes." An examination of
the cases revealed the lack of foresight of the court as a prophet on this issue.
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tection against an unlawful search and seizure, an examination of the cases will
reveal the very thing occurring that has here been suggested as a possibility under
the present immunity act.
The fourth issue raised for determination-that of whether the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination precludes the immunity act, regardless of its
scope or application, again raises serious question. Those challenging the act very
forcefully contend that the Constitution does preclude the immunity statutes.
One of the contentions is that this immunity provided by the act is nothing but a
pardon, the exercise of which is vested in the executive branch of government
beyond legislative control." Those favoring the act under this argument by
calling this a type of amnesty, a right of the legislative branch to grant They
concede that there is no practical difference in effect, the only important difference
being that the legislature can enact as to the one.
The argument is also advanced by nearly all writers suggesting the act to
be unconstitutional, and by most of the dissenting opinions where the act has been
sustained, that immunity statutes are merely efforts to circumvent the Constitution
with a compliance with the amending process provided. It would seem that this
argument is the very crux of the entire problem, because all other arguments would
fail if it were to be accepted. Perhaps the soundness of the argument is the reason
that little if anything was mentioned in the majority opinion in the Ullnann case
discrediting it. A careful reading of that opinion will reveal only the following:
"Nothing new can be put into the Constitution except through the amendatory
process. Nothing old can be taken out without the same process.",, Certainly
no quarrel would be made with such a statement. In fact, perhaps that is the
very basis on which this argument rests. Actually it is very clear. The Constitution has, by a specific provision, provided that a witness shall not be forced to
give testimony tending to incriminate himself. This right thereby granted is not
conditioned or qualified by any other provision. It is absolute. Is it unreasonable
to conclude that other powers derived from the constitution adversely affecting
this Individual right must be subordinated to it? If not, then the constitutional
authority of a legislative act derived from the granted power to protect the national security, and implied in this case from the necessary and proper clause,
would then seem to fall within that prohibition. If such were the case, then the
argument that legislative authority to provide immunity is derived from the Constitution must fail. There would then be left open the possibility of arguing by
analogy that other apparently absolute rights are interpreted, without causing
excess controversy, to be relative. Such would be the position of the freedomsfreedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of press, and the right of assembly-all protected by the First Amendment.For purposes of discussion,

42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1, reads: "The President ... shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States .... "
43. 76 Sup. Ct. 497, 501 (1956).
44. U.S. CONSr. Amend. I.
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take the freedom of speech provision. No one would seriously question the right
of the federal government to restrict abuses of this right. The courts, in determining the validity of restraints placed thereon, have stated that they are to be
exercised with some restraint." During wartime, perhaps under the very situation underlying the present problem-national defense and security-restraints
in the form of censorship are imposed. And, as an example traditional in this
respect, one would not be justified under an exercise of the freedom of speech
provision of the Constitution to rush into a crowded theatre and falsely shout,
"Fire "
By what authority are such rights restricted? The courts, in interpreting the
provisions of the First Amendment, have referred to the fact that it states that
"Congress shall make no law" affecting those rights. It has been decided that by
this an absolute right was not granted, but instead a limitation on governmental
interference, so long as the freedoms are properly exercised within recognized
bounds."
However, such a result would not follow from a proper interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. It is made as an absolute
grant-one wholly without the possibility of legislative interference. It is thus
suggested that the difference in wording of the two constitutional provisions lends
credit to different interpretations. The First Amendment, as mentioned above,
provides a prohibition against legislative authority, interpreted to mean a relative
prohibition. However, the Fifth Amendment does not suggest limitations on legislative acts, nor does it even impliedly anticipate such, but rather covers an
absolute individual right This might be interpreted to mean that it is not conditional-that rights of innocent third persons, though adversely affected by the protection thus conferred, are not superior to the rights derived under the Fifth
Amendment provision against self-incrimination. Perhaps it might be said that
the question resolves itself into one depending on the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, and the extent to which it is to be applied. To justify a difference in interpretation, it is necessary to recognize the background existent at the time these
protections were included in the Constitution. At the time of the adoption of
the First Amendment, there was little question but that it would not destroy
actions based on an abuse of the right of free speech-such as libel and slander.
It was apparently adopted with the knowledge and intent that it be relative.
However, there was a difference in the existing background as applied to the Fifth

45. N.L.R.B. v. Pick Mfg. Co., 135 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1943); Kiyoshi Okamoto
v. U.S, 152 F.2d 905 (C.C.A. Wyo. 1946); In re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp., 129
F.2d 173! (7th Cir. 1942) cert. denied Kausal v. 79th and Esconaba Corp., 317 U.S.
670 (1942); U.S. v. Hartzel, 138 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1943); reversed 322 U.S. 680
(1944).
46. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Bowe v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946).
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Amendment. There were no qualifications to the right against self-incrimination
existent, and none were anticipated. It was not then adopted with the intent that
it be relative, as was true in regard to the First Amendment. The setting in which
these two amendments came into existence would then seem to substantiate a
distinction in their interpretation. Thus, if the distinction can properly be made,
we have presented for determination a legislative act amending the constitutional
provision. This is clearly improper.
Such a distinction as herein suggested has apparently not been mentioned,
or at least given much attention, by the courts. Perhaps it is a distinction without a difference. But, if it could be said to be valid, as would seem entirely reasonable, then the present act should be held unconstitutional.
Somewhat in line with this suggestion, though not going so far as to distinguish the cases where restraints in constitutionally guaranteed rights are existent is the following statement of Mr. Justice Blatehford,,7 quoted with approval
in the dissenting opinion of Brown v. Walker,"' fully presenting the problem, when
he said: "The constitutional provision distinctly declares that a person shall not 9be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;' and the protection
of section 860 is not coextensive with the constitutional provision. Legislation
cannt detract from the privilege afforded by the Constitution. It would be quite
another thing if the Constitution had provided that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, unless it should be provided
by statute that criminating evidence extracted from a witness against his will
should not be used against him. But a mere act of Congress cannot amend the
Constitution, even if it should engraft thereon such a proviso."
The complexity of the problem which this and similar cases present is self-evident. The immense consideration and conflict that go into making a decision on a
factual situation thus presented may likewise be readily seen.
From a reading of the many arguments advanced by both groups on this
problem, it may be concluded that considerable thought and reflection is being given
to the proper determination of the issue. If judicial precedents are to be weighed
at all in reaching any type of conclusion, there is only one determination that
could be made-that the immunity acts are, and will be, sustained. But a reading
of earnest, thought provoking dissenting opinions would lead one to the conclusion
that all may not be as well settled as it might appear at first blush. Perhaps more
decisions will be necessary following the Ullman case to be able to foresee any
definite trend indicating the extent to which the court will go in applying the
doctrines it has set forth. It would seem, however, that pending such litigation,

47. Counselman v. Hithcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
48. Il U.S. 591, 619 (1896).
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careful attention might be given to this problem, it being one both of extreme
importance and vital interest."9
ELVIN S. DOUGLAS, JR.

49. Probably the most important suggestions or remedies that have not been
discussed in this paper are those relating to statutes of comity between the states
and the federal governments. It apparently is felt by many imminent authorities
that that is the only proper and practical solution to the problem. Mr. Morgan
seems to say that it is unnecessary that both state and federal immunity be
granted to sufficiently protect the defendant, and submitted that the minority view
to the contrary was unsound. The real issue, he indicated, was one of comity and
policy. This line of attack may be pursued further in 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949),
an article by Mr. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. In light of
more recent opinions-particularly the Adams v. State of Maryland and the principal case (Ullmann), it would seem that the only need for comity-if this is to
be pursued-would be by the federal government, recognizing immunity statutes
of each of the forty-eight states-a result highly unlikely.
Arguments have been submitted on both sides of this general problem and
useful discussion thereof may be found in Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today
(Harvard News Service 1955); 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2250 ot seq. (3d Ed.
1940); 39 ILL. L. Rnv. 184 (1944); 53 YALn L. J. 364 (1944); 30 CORNELL L.Q. 255
(1944). A related discussion of this problem as it affects the Fifth Amendment
constitutional guarantee more directly may be found in 21 Mo. L. RLv. 66 (1956).
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